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Introduction  
 
The valuation of distressed companies consists in a highly topical issue in modern business 
which has been developed by corporate finance literature over a long time. Despite its 
importance, few contributions allow taking into account correctly specific features of firms in 
financial troubles, such as low or even negative cash flows, declining growth rates, high levels 
of financial exposure, undeniable default probabilities. Models should appropriately consider 
that financial crisis can generate important consequences not only for the firm under valuation, 
in terms of liquidation or continuation as going-concern, but for the economy as a whole as 
well. According to Altman and Hotchkiss (2006), the unsuccessful business enterprise can be 
defined in different ways, by using terms very common in literature, such as failure, default, 
insolvency and bankruptcy. A brief definition of each of them let us clarifying the framework 
of valuation. In economic terms, failure means that the yield on invested capital is significantly 
and repeatedly lower with respect to rate of returns on similar investments for different reasons. 
Alternatively, failure occurs either when revenues are insufficient to cover the costs or the 
average return of investments is lower than the cost of capital. The economic interpretation of 
failure does not consider the implications of this sort of situation, such as firm’s exit or 
continuation. Default can be technical and/or legal and always involve a relationship between 
creditors and debtors. Technical default occurs when a company (or, in general terms, a debtor) 
violates one or more conditions regulating the agreement with a creditor, such as the debt ratio. 
Usually these violations are signals of deteriorating firm performances. While, if a firm misses 
a scheduled loan or bond repayment, legal default can potentially occur. In some cases, firms’ 
default can be avoided thanks to distress restructuring procedures agreed with creditors, 
avoiding bankruptcy declarations at least for some years. Insolvency describes a situation in 
which a lack of liquidity does not allow the reimbursement of current obligations. The condition 
of technical insolvency can be temporarily, even if it may turn into a formal bankruptcy 
declaration. More complex and dangerous is insolvency in a bankruptcy sense, which occur 
when firm’s total liabilities exceed the value of total assets, generating overdue debts in balance 
sheets.  
When a company suffers for financial distress, it has not enough proceeds to reimburse its 
obligations with the cash flows generated from operations and it is usually not able to obtain 
additional debt as a reasonable cost, given the high risk of insolvency. According to Jennergren 
(2013), in recent years many companies have faced severe operating (other than financial) 
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problems, among which low or even negative cash flows. All of them contribute to increase 
uncertainty surrounding future survival that is reflected in the market by a drop in equity prices 
(or, alternatively by an increase in the rate stocks’ rate of return). This phenomenon cannot be 
ignored in valuation models; there are different opinions in literature about the way to deal with 
uncertainty when forecasting and actualising expected future cash flows generated by the 
distressed companies. While, for companies that are not listed, the valuation is more 
complicated and often based on past data or comparable companies. In this paper, we will 
provide some suggestions for valuing them as well.  
It is in such framework that credit analysis intervenes in determining the creditworthiness of a 
firm, which is the ability to pay debt at the scheduled times (i.e. to respect covenants on debt). 
It involves a deep analysis of the business, financial and accounting conditions of the firm under 
valuation. The main task of credit analysis is assessing the probability that a firm will face 
financial distress, failing to repay its financial obligations. Once financial distress is recognised, 
we need to distinguish if such a situation is irreversible or can be turned around thanks to some 
insolvency procedures. 
Consequently, the management should intervene and define the best strategies to overcome 
such a situation. The most efficient solutions are those that maximise firm value from the cash 
flow generated by the assets. We can identify almost three possible alternatives management 
can choose:  
- Firm restructuring with the perspective of continuing operations as going-concern. In 
this case, the management stipulates an agreement with creditors, who usually accept a 
reduction and a deferment on their promised amounts in order to facilitate company’s 
survival. If an entity’s intrinsic or economic value is higher than its current liquidation 
value, it should try to reorganize itself and continue its operations; 
- Change in firm’s ownership (i.e. a change in management); even in this case, a 
continuity in operations is assumed; 
- Firm’s liquidation: assets are sold in the market when they cannot potentially produce 
additional value inside that particular context. 
In this paper, we want to focus our attention mainly on the first alternative, remembering that 
firm’s survival is subject to the possibility of exploiting all the existing assets, resources and 
skills in order to return to a sustainable financial equilibrium in the future. The going-concern 
hypothesis is usually included in the reorganization plan agreed with creditors. The latter also 
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involves assumptions about outputs and actions that will guarantee the success of the 
reorganization plan and will influence the computation of the going-concern capital value as 
well.  
The valuation process can be considered as a step-by-step process that begins with an analysis 
of firm’s historical financial results and balance sheets, which reflects past management 
decisions. Then, after a review of the main value drivers included in projection forecasts, 
estimates of the enterprise value and its variability should be performed. In doing so, we should 
not take into account only the assessments of management’s strategic plans, but metrics of 
historical performances as well. In addition, a risk analysis conducted by changing forecast 
inputs (i.e. a scenario analysis) can be considered as a powerful instrument to address 
uncertainty in forecasts and to create a certain degree of confidence about expectations.  
Summing up, in the first chapter we will provide an analysis of the methods developed in 
literature that allows obtaining estimates of the enterprise value. Therefore, we will distinguish 
cash-flow based methods (i.e. the Discounted Cash Flow, the Adjusted Present Value and the 
Capital Cash Flow approaches) from other methods, such as those referring to Option Pricing 
theory (i.e. Black-Scholes and Merton models) and Multiples as well. Then we will proceed by 
computing an estimate of the enterprise value by combining the DCF methodology and market 
multiples, taking into account that many distressed firms plan to reduce their leverage ratios to 
certain targets over time by devoting free cash flows to reimburse obligations, as Arzac (1996) 
suggests. 
The valuation continues by computing Equity and Debt values. Indeed, option pricing theory 
allows considering equity as a call option on firm’s value, assuming that the latter follows a 
continuous process with constant volatility. Thanks to Black-Scholes and Merton models, the 
value of the firm’s risky debt can be decomposed in two components: a risk-free component 
and a put option on firm’s value. In case of financial distress, companies show a market value 
of debt usually lower than its nominal value; therefore, we want to justify such discrepancy 
both in theory and in practice.   
In chapter three, we distinguish between Out-of-Court and In-Court procedures as possible 
ways to overcome firms’ financial troubles. Both have some associated advantages and 
disadvantages relative to the specific company under valuation and the surrounding framework 
as well. In literature, we find evidence about firms’ propensity to adopt procedures that are 
independent from judicial intervention, given their relative convenience. So, Gilson et al. (1990) 
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sustain there is a large amount of firms in financial distress that avoid default through debt 
restructuring and thus stipulating some private agreements with creditors (i.e. reorganization 
plans), which usually involve some reductions in net transfers from debtors to creditors, other 
than payment delays. Creditors have a collective interest in unilaterally reduce their cash flow 
claims prior to liquidation, since the amount they can extract from the firm through a liquidation 
procedure would be even lower. Mella-Barral P. and Perraudin W. (1999) recognise that 
debtor’s default rarely coincide with liquidation since debt is often reorganised through out-of-
Court procedures. Moreover, Franks J. R. and Torous W. N. (1994) affirm that many firms 
adopt in-Court procedures only after attempting to resolve their financial difficulties informally 
and therefore as an alternative solution. 
Finally, in the last chapter we want to apply the theoretical notions investigated in the previous 
sections specifically to a distressed firm. Therefore, we will provide a case study in which the 
company is valued as going-concern and it has been able to conclude private agreements with 
creditors in order to restore a sustainable financial equilibrium. The goal is to quantify the 
difference between the risk-free and risky components of debt as sized by the put value.  
In the first case, we assume that Merton’s assumptions hold: there is a unique tranche of a Zero 
Coupon Debt outstanding and therefore a single maturity date in the future. We will find out 
that, despite the limitations associated to such an approach, we are able to obtain closed-form 
solutions for capital components in a relatively simple and clear way. We also provide a 
sensitivity analysis that allows interpreting results in case of changes in input factors, such as 
enterprise values and asset volatilities.  
In the second case, we take into account the introduction of two tranches of zero coupon debt: 
a short-term and a long-term one. In doing so, we increase the complexity of firm capital 
structure by introducing at least two maturity dates. Such a modification also allows dealing 
with situations in which the firm benefits from additional sources of finance (i.e. “new finance”) 
which facilitate the continuation of operations and require a “super priority” reimbursement 
with respect to other pre-existing obligations. Referring to this aspect, we provide some 
adjustments to the original Merton’s formula, which is considered as a linear combination of 
call options on firm assets.  
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CHAPTER ONE: The Enterprise Value computation  
1.1 Different methods for valuing distressed companies: Cash Flow-based 
approaches 
Analysts usually face some problems when valuing distressed firms due to their intrinsic 
characteristics, such as low or even negative cash flows, declining margins, high level of 
financial exposure and undeniable default probabilities. Traditional valuation models in 
literature therefore need to be “adjusted” in order to take into account the effect of financial 
distress in a consistent fashion. Among them, we can distinguish cash flow-based models, such 
as the Discounted Cash Flows (DCF), the Adjusted Present Value (APV) and the Capital Cash 
Flow (CCF) models. All these models involve the computation of the firm’s enterprise value 
from the expected cash flows generated from its assets, by assuming that the target will be able 
to continue its operations in the future (i.e. going-concern assumption). Such models are usually 
applied to firms in normal business circumstances, but they can be rearranged to value 
companies in financial distress as well. Concerning to this, Jennergren (2013) complains that 
uncertainty is not clearly visible in traditional valuation approaches, whereas highly uncertain 
cash consequences need to be discounted for valuing distressed firms correctly. The risk of 
firm’s default has a great impact on value and consequently it should be considered explicitly 
in valuations.  
Gilson et al. (2010) recognise a significant dispersion error (i.e. from 20% to 250%) when 
comparing estimates from traditional valuation models based on cash flows forecasts and 
market values. We can identify some reasons that can justify such gap in values: the choice of 
the valuation model, the likelihood that firms will not survive in the future and the assumptions 
made about discount rates and future growth rates as well. Moreover, analysts often found their 
valuations on a set of limited information with respect to their amount and quality: they have a 
closer correspondence to market values than management forecasts, since they have some 
difficulties to access firms’ data, especially when companies are not listed. There is also a 
problem connected to “strategic valuations”: different incentives of the parties involved in debt 
negotiation can influence estimates of value. Indeed, junior and senior claim holders play a 
special role. They have different motivations in relation to cash flows estimates: senior 
claimants tend to underestimate firm’s value in order to increase their recovery in case of a 
bankruptcy procedure, while junior claimants have the opposite incentive, given that they are 
reimbursed at first in case of liquidation. As a matter of facts, we can conclude that relative 
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bargaining power of both claimants has an impact on firms’ value estimates through cash flows 
models.  
In the following paragraphs, we will provide a concise analysis of the advantages and 
limitations associated to each cash flow-based model. The same analysis will be extended to 
other approaches for valuing firms as well, such as those based on multiples and option pricing 
theory.  
 
1.1.1 The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach 
This approach is the most widely used and common in corporate finance, since it is able to link 
firm’s value to the ability of producing an adequate amount of cash flow in order to satisfy the 
expectations of investors. In normal circumstances, the value of a firm puts its basis on three 
main pillars: expected future cash flows forecasts, cost of capital estimates and terminal value 
computation. According to this approach, firm’s value drivers - such as the expected annual 
sale growth and the EBITDA margin - play an important role. Projections need to be computed 
from historical data and market data (when available). Practically, there are some difficulties in 
obtaining precise estimates when the firm is actually in a financial distress situation and there 
is a positive likelihood of default in the future. In this case, it is better to extend the projection 
period until the end of debt restructuring and the achievement of a steady-state equilibrium. The 
DCF method is very applied in practice thanks to its flexibility, which allows valuing different 
types of firms. Anyway, it has some limitations: for instance, it assumes the firm has a 
potentially infinite life in the future and that it can continue to operate by overcoming almost 
all its financial problems. By the way, when there is a significant probability for a firm to default 
in the future, these assumptions seem not very realistic and reliable. This is only a small 
overview about the assumptions and the main advantages-disadvantages of the model; we will 
provide a deep analysis of such approach in the following paragraphs, since we will use it in 
our case study as well.  
 
1.1.2 The Adjusted Present Value (APV) approach 
Differently from the DCF approach, APV models consider explicitly the effects of obligations 
on firm’s value: the value of a levered firm is computed by adding costs and benefits of debt to 
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its unlevered value. On one side, debt can generate positive value of tax shields, but on the other 
side, it can increase the probability of default. However, for distressed firms, negative effects 
tend to prevail with respect to the positive, leading to higher values of default probabilities with 
respect to healthy firms. Consequently, the model should be reformulated in order to take into 
account explicitly the increasing role of the costs associated to default, which are weighted by 
the probability of default. The total firm’s levered value is therefore given by discounting the 
unlevered FCF, the value of the tax shield (that is a measure of debt benefits) and the adjusted 
value of bankruptcy costs. For instance, Damodaran (2006) suggests computing the cost of 
distress as the difference between the value of the firm as going-concern and its liquidation 
value, but in general, there are other computational problems when applying such an approach. 
Like all the other cash flow-based models, the APV approach requires a precise estimate of 
firm’s default probability, but it also needs an analysis of operating firm’s losses that 
compromises the possibility to benefit from tax shields. When firms face a deep financial crisis, 
tax benefits on debt are substantially reduced: either very low or negative EBIT values impede 
to take advantage from the deduction of interest expenses on taxable income, increasing the 
firm’s leverage and probability of default. We can therefore conclude that this approach is not 
suitable for financially distressed firms with substantial operating problems, but it can be 
combined with other approaches to obtain more accurate estimates of value. 
 
1.1.3 The Capital Cash Flow (CCF) approach 
Ruback (2000) tries to overcome some traditional models limitations by introducing an 
alternative approach, known as Capital Cash Flow model, whose name derives from the fact 
that it includes all the cash available to capital providers. It follows directly from Free Cash 
Flow models, but, differently, it takes into account explicitly the value of debt tax shields. The 
APV approach takes into account tax shields on debt too but it usually uses a different rate: the 
cost of debt replaces the cost of assets used in CCF models. By attributing a higher value to the 
deductibility of interests, the enterprise value will be higher by applying the APV method than 
the CCF one. CCF and APV models differ for the assumptions made on leverage as well: the 
former assumes that debt is proportional to firm’s value, while the second assumes that debt is 
fixed and independent on firm’s value. We know that distressed firms’ valuations usually rely 
on estimates about firms’ future debt policy; when the latter involves a target debt-to-level ratio, 
the CCF approach seems less accurate than the APV. On the other side, if debt is likely to 
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increase as firm’s value increases, then the proportional assumption seems more appropriate. 
CCF and APV approaches can be combined as well; an example is provided by Gilson et al. 
(2000) in the valuation of firms emerging from bankruptcy. Anyway, CCF or equivalent FCF 
methods are generally preferred to APV, since in most corporate circumstances debt levels tend 
to change as market values change.  
 
1.2 Other approaches: 
1.2.1 Market multiples  
Differently from cash flow-based methodologies, we mention here the method of multiples, 
which is very used in practice since it is relatively easy to implement. Multiples are computed 
considering both market observations and data extracted from financial statements, such as 
enterprise values and equity values. Their popularity derives from the limits on the amount of 
underlying assumptions and the rapidity of calculation with respect to cash flow-based methods. 
They, furthermore, let a closer correspondence to market belief. Anyway, approaches based on 
multiples have some limitations as well, starting from the “simplicity” mentioned before, which 
can be a source of imprecise estimates. It is not easy to identify a homogeneous sample for 
distressed firms as the model suggests, since each firm shows specific characteristics that cannot 
be generalised to other companies. Moreover, multiples apply only on positive results; this can 
be a problem in case of very low or even negative expectations about annual growth rates on 
sales and expected cash flow generated by the firm as well. As Koller et al. (2010) underlines, 
we should take into account forward-looking multiples rather than multiples based on historical 
data in order to be consistent with the principles of valuation. Empirical evidence shows that 
forward-looking multiples are more accurate predictors of value than the historical-looking 
ones. Therefore, we need to make forecasts that are in line with the long-term prospects both of 
the firm and the business. As we will discuss later, multiples are commonly applied after 
assuming a steady-state equilibrium for distressed firms and therefore a certain stationarity in 
firms’ capital structures. Multiples-based models can be combined with the DCF approach for 
computing the value of firms’ capital structure components more precisely. Due to this, asset 
side multiples (such as EV/EBITDA margins) are generally preferred to equity side multiples 
because they are less dependent on firms’ capital structure, which is likely to fluctuate 
frequently in distress situations. 
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1.2.2 The approach based on Options 
Finally, we can involve another approach for valuing firms in trouble that relies on options. We 
can find the original version of such methodology in Black and Scholes (1973), and a modified 
version in Merton (1974). By considering option theory, we are able to determine a positive 
value for firm’s equity even in situations where the value of firms’ assets is lower than the value 
of firms’ debt, as in case of distress frameworks. We can assess firms by taking into account 
the logic behind methods for valuing options: meaning that equity is considered as an option of 
firms’ assets with a strike price equal to the nominal value of debt. In most companies, 
shareholders can decide in every moment to liquidate assets and use the proceeds to reimburse 
obligations, leaving the control on the hands of creditors. Moreover, shareholders usually have 
limited responsibilities, meaning that they cannot lose more than the capital invested in the firm. 
Equivalently, option pricing theory allows us considering debt as a put option on firm’s assets. 
Among the merits of this model, we can mention the computation of a risk-neutral probability 
measure (which consists in the probability that the nominal value of debt will be higher than 
asset value at maturity) and the attribution of a certain value to uncertainty characterizing future 
firms’ profitability. However, the limitations of such approach are mostly related to its 
assumptions, which are usually considered far from what happens in the real world. According 
to Koller et al. (2010) an important practical disadvantage is associated to the hypothesis that 
every source of uncertainty is considered as independent from the others, while in reality we 
can usually find some correlations between them. A crucial limitation is involved in the 
consideration of a single zero coupon bond as well. For its complexity and importance in 
distressed-firms’ valuation, the option-based model merits a deep investigation, which will be 
provided in the second chapter of this paper. 
 
1.3 A systematic solution for valuing distressed firms and some implications 
The main goal of analysts and professionals is to determine the “correct” (or, better, the most 
adapted) model or combination of models that allows to deal with uncertainty, default 
probabilities, other that credible values for capital structure components. We propose to value 
highly distressed companies by considering the following steps one by one. Firstly, we assume 
that the firm will continue to operate even if it is temporarily in financial trouble. Indeed, we 
estimate firms’ enterprise value by discounting expected cash flows from their assets, according 
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to the DCF approach. The latter relies on a set of assumptions that allows dealing with some 
important features of distressed companies, affording more precise estimates. When firms are 
assumed to restore sustainable financial stability, we can opt for methods based on multiples, 
which are easier and faster to compute. A steady-state framework is usually assumed in 
correspondence of firms’ terminal values computation, assuming they will continue to grow at 
a constant rate in an infinite horizon.  
The following paragraph is therefore assigned to the computation of the enterprise value. In 
usual circumstances, analysts obtain actual estimates of firm’s value by discounting cash flows 
at the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC); but, in case of distressed firms valuation, it 
seems not to be the best discount factor. Indeed, as we will discuss in the last paragraph of the 
first chapter, analysts and researchers have different opinions about the adjustments which need 
to be implemented in order to take into account fluctuations in firms’ leverage and default risk 
as well. Anyway, we are allowed to employ the WACC for obtaining firms’ terminal value 
without lots of practical implications, since capital structures are assumed to be stable over 
time. 
Our valuation continues in the second chapter with a description of option pricing theory and 
Merton’s model (1974) as well. The closed-form option pricing formula derived by Merton 
(1974) allows us obtaining the value of firms’ equity by considering estimates of enterprise 
value as underlying price and nominal value of debt as strike price. Then, by differentiating 
assets and equity values, we obtain estimates of market values of debt, which differ from 
nominal values of debt in distress circumstances. In this section, we will also provide some 
evidences about the computation of asset returns volatility, which is one of the main input 
entering the famous Merton’s formula. Among different methodologies we can find in 
literature, we prefer computing asset returns volatility from equity returns volatility, by 
involving the Black and Scholes option pricing formula (1973).  Once we have completed the 
theoretical valuation of distressed companies, we provide some proceeds that can be 
implemented in order to avoid default. In particular, we focus our attention on the debt 
restructuring through private agreements between creditors and distressed firm’s manager. As 
we will discuss later, the parties involved can choose among different solutions in order to lead 
the company continuing its activities.  
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1.4 The Enterprise Value computation in DCF models 
In order to determine the value of a company in financial distress, the starting point consists in 
estimating the Enterprise Value. The latter can be expressed as follows: 
Enterprise value = asset value = net debt + market value of equity 
Where net debt = market value of debt – cash 
Firms’ enterprise value is computed both considering expected financial results that firms will 
probably achieve in the future and information included in balance sheets as well. In doing so, 
we try to distinguish firms’ capital components (i.e. enterprise value (EV), debt (D) and equity 
(E)) through the entire valuation, even if there are some interconnections between them. As 
Buttignon  (2014) underlines, the realization of EV is subject to the approval of creditors, thus 
it depends on D. Creditors have a crucial position in distress firms: the adoption of the plan 
depends on their consent, but at the same time, by accepting the implementation of the financial 
remedies, they are granting added value to current and new shareholders. As we will discuss 
later, the value transferred from debt to equity holders after the plan’s approval is measured by 
a put option on the firm’s value.  
We compute firms’ enterprise value by applying both the DCF model and multiples. According 
to the first methodology, we have to forecast the proceeds the target will be able to achieve 
from its operations in order to reimburse its obligations, under a going-concern assumption. As 
Gilson et al. (2000) underline, such valuation is therefore performed through a set of 
negotiations that are involved in the reorganization plan.  
The value of a firm can be expressed as a function of four main elements: the ability of the firm 
to generate cash flows from its assets in place, the expected growth rate of the cash flows, the 
length of time the firm needs to restore a sustainable financial equilibrium and, finally, the cost 
of capital. Thus, the firm’s value is sensitive to a change in one or more of the previous 
variables. We can consider at first the value of a single asset: it is obtained by discounting the 
expected cash flows generated by such asset, at a rate that reflects its riskiness. This procedure 
allows computing the so-called “intrinsic value” of an asset:  
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = ∑
𝐸(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑡)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
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Where the asset has a hypothetic life extending from one to N years, and r is the discount rate 
reflecting the riskiness of the cash flows. By considering the firm as a portfolio (i.e. a 
combination) of assets, it is possible to extend the previous equation to find the total firm’s 
value. In this way, we consider all the expected cash flows generated by the assets as a whole.  
The process is not so easy to implement, since a significant portion of the firm’s value is 
influenced by expectations about future investments, other than assets that are already in place. 
In other words, we need an estimate of the cash flows the firm expects to realise, allowing the 
reimbursement of its obligations over time.  According to Guthner (2012), the DCF model turns 
to be a forward-looking process that has to rely on a forecast of the general business conditions 
of the economy as a whole, including the unique factors driving the industry where the company 
operates and the context of the company’s business strategy. Anyway, the model jointly implies 
an analysis of historical financial performances, operating and overall costs, operating profits 
and net income related to revenues as well. Thus, a more precise estimate of the company’s 
future financial performances can be obtained by combining metrics of historical financial 
performances (i.e. past balance sheets and income statements), reorganization plans, and 
valuations of current and expected business conditions in the future. 
An important assumption underlying the DCF model regards the life of the firm: we assume 
that the firm will continue to operate in the future, even if it is actually facing a financial distress 
situation. Therefore, the firm is valued as a going-concern, by looking at the cash flows it will 
achieve if it will follow a path back to financial health, exploiting existing assets, resources and 
skills in a potential infinite-life period. In order to compute the going-concern value of a firm it 
is useful to determine the projection period of the valuation. According to Buttignon (2014), it 
has at least the same duration of the reorganization plan proposed by the management (i.e. 
generally from three to five years). A second period is usually added in order to grant to the 
firm the possibility to restore an equilibrium condition. At the end of the reference period, we 
estimate the firm’s Terminal Value or Continuing Value (CV), by assuming the cash flows 
growing at a constant rate for an infinite period. Thus, we can decompose the DCF value of a 
firm in this way: 
DCF value = Present value of cash flows during projection period + Present value of 
continuing value 
We proceed by differentiating the cash flows generated during the projection period from the 
calculation of the present value of the continuing value. 
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1.4.1 The Free Cash Flow during the Projection Period in distressed 
companies 
The DCF methodology allows us reflecting the main effects of financial distress on firms’ value 
determination, which should be incorporated in both firms’ expected cash flows and discount 
rates. A deep valuation considers all the possible scenarios a firm can potentially face in the 
future (i.e. scenario analysis), from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic one. In 
particular, in a financial distress framework, it is interesting to study the firm’s ability to service 
debt under challenges scenarios, especially those in which the probability of default is 
extremely high. To this purpose, we should consider not only the nominal amount of debt that 
the firm should repay over time, but the tenor of debt as well. According to Guthner (2012), we 
should not forget debt maturity when valuing the firm’s financial sustainability: long-term debt 
may allow the company to survive at a reasonable cost with respect to short-term debt. The 
management may have time to decide and implement remedial actions, which contribute to the 
debt reimbursement.  
The ability to service debt is necessarily linked to the expected cash flow generated in each 
scenario. More precisely, the expected cash flows generated by the firm during the reference 
period can be written as the sum of the probability-weighted estimates of the cash flows under 
all the scenarios considered. Analytically, the expected cash flow value can be derived as 
follow: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  ∑ 𝜋𝑗𝑡(𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡
𝑛
𝑗=1
) 
 
Where 𝜋𝑗𝑡 is the probability of scenario j in period t and 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗𝑡 is the cash flows generated 
under that scenario in that period. An important feature is that each input has to be estimated 
each year, since probabilities and cash flows may change over time. Adjustments are 
cumulative and have a greater impact in the later years. An approximation of the expected cash 
flow calculation would require estimates of only two possible scenarios: the going-concern and 
the distress one. Under the first scenario, we suppose that the financial distress is temporary, 
while, under the distress scenario, we assume that the firm will default and will be liquidated 
because of its insolvency situation. Thus, we should determine the cash flows generated from 
the liquidation procedure or the divestment of the entire firm. Precisely, the liquidation value 
of a firm derives from the difference between the market value of assets sold and the associated 
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liabilities in the balance sheet. In this simplified framework, the expected cash flows can be 
obtained as a weighted average of the two scenarios, weighted by the probability to face one of 
the two in the future:  
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑡 = (𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔−𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 ) ∗ (𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡) +
(𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠,𝑡) ∗ (1 − 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡)  
Where 𝜋𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛,𝑡 is the cumulative probability that the firm will continue to operate as a 
going concern at time t.  
In general, once we have an estimate of the expected cash flows generated each year in the 
projection period using the traditional DCF approach, we should discount them at the valuation 
date, using a proper discount factor. Thus, the value of the firm is analytically derived in the 
following way:  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 =  ∑
𝐸(𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡)
(1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1
 
The expected cash flow generated by the firm’s assets are addressed to the firm’s claimants, in 
particular bond and equity holders. According to Koller (2010), the DCF method employed to 
evaluate a firm is therefore built on the cash flows available to investors over time. Once we 
have an estimate of the firm’s value during the projection period, we have to continue our 
valuation by computing its Continuing Value, which has a great impact on the total assessment.  
 
1.4.2 The Continuing Value in distressed firms 
The Continuing Value (CV) of a firm captures the value of the cash flows generated after the 
reference or projection period, in which we assume the firm will be able to restore an 
equilibrium condition, by reimbursing most of its financial obligations. Thus, the cash flows 
generated reflect almost “normalized” operations, which are expected to be sustainable over 
time. This assumption allows us to employ multiples in our valuation, taking into account 
comparable companies. Moreover, in the medium-long run firms in the same sectors tend to 
share the same growth rates, profitability and risk. Such reflections cannot be extended to the 
previous reference period, given the dynamic firm’s capital structure and thus the conjectures 
included in the organization plan, which depend from firm to firm. Market multiples apply to 
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“normalised” financial results, such as earnings before interests, taxes (i.e. EBIT), depreciation 
and amortization (i.e. EBITDA) and/or EBIT and amortization. Other than select carefully a set 
of comparable companies, we should examine whether multiples registered today can be 
reasonably applied at the end of the forecasting period. If there are significant discrepancies 
between the company profile and the one of comparable companies, we should compute 
discounts to market multiples, since these differences are generally difficult to identify.  
An alternative approach to compute the CV consists in applying the Growing Perpetuity 
formula to the expected cash flows generated in the subsequent period after the forecasting one. 
Assuming a “normalised” steady-state equilibrium, we can also consider the value of the 
underlying drivers (i.e. NOPLAT, RONIC and g) to determine the continuing value, as we can 
observe from the following equation:  
𝐶𝑉𝑡 =
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
=
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑡+1 (1 −
𝑔
𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐼𝐶)
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 − 𝑔
 
 
Since the perpetuity-based formula relies on parameters that never change, we should use them 
to find the CV of the firm when the firm has reached a certain steadiness with low but stable 
revenue growth (the value of the firm’s growth on its assets is expressed by g), and stable 
operating margins. The growth rate for distressed companies has to be potentially sustainable 
in an infinite horizon and cannot be higher than the growth rate of the economy (i.e. the risk-
free rate). Once the CV is calculated, we have to update it by considering the discount factor 
employed in the last year of the explicit forecast period. Finally, the enterprise value is 
computed by summing the present value of the expected cash flows during the forecasting 
horizon and the actual value of the CV, which has a great impact in firms’ valuation and thus 
should be estimated carefully. Indeed, according to Damodaran (2009), some analysts are 
driven by “auto-pilot optimism” when valuing a firm with a history of financial health becoming 
in trouble. It means they have an excessive overconfidence in the firm’s ability to restore an 
equilibrium path. Optimism normally drive the determination of growth rates (i.e. positive a 
growth in the future), discount rates similar to those of healthy companies and high future 
profitability (i.e. margins and returns back to the pre-distressed framework). By assuming a 
going-concern framework, there is always a “happy ending” in which firms never default and 
their terminal value is large. While empirical observation suggest most firms do not survive in 
the long-term period and they are forced to exit the business; this usually happens when a firm 
is not able to reimburse its debts using the cash flows from operations. As consequence of the 
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financial failure, the company may have to liquidate its assets and use all the proceeds to repay 
debt. 
In order to arrange traditional cash flow valuation for the risk of distress, we need to adjust the 
discount rate as well: in fact, riskier firms have higher cost of equity, debt and capital in 
comparison to safer firms. A higher risk implying a higher cost of capital leads to a reduction 
in the firm’s expected value. A deep investigation of the possible solutions for the computation 
of the cost of capital is provided in the next paragraph.  
 
1.5 The cost of capital for distressed firms  
The determination of the cost of capital needed to discount expected future cash flows strictly 
depends on the company under valuation. Thus, the WACC is commonly applied since it 
ensures consistency between its components and free cash flow: 
𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 =  
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
(1 − 𝜏)𝑟𝐷 +
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
𝑟𝐸 
 An accurate estimate of the discount factor is crucial for obtaining reliable firms’ values. In 
order to compute the cost of capital, judgements of the cost of equity, the after-tax cost of debt 
and the company’s target capital structure are required. Since each of the previous variable is 
not directly observable, we need to take into account different models, assumptions and 
approximations.  
The cost of equity is determined by three factors: the risk-free rate of return, the market-wide 
risk premium and a risk-adjustment factor that reflects each company’s riskiness. In order to 
estimate it, the CAPM approach is usually employed. The latter adjusts for the company specific 
risk thanks to beta (𝛽), which measures stock co-movements with the market. Since it is not 
directly observable, we need to derive its value. The latter can be computed empirically through 
the market model, by regressing firm’s return (i.e. 𝑟𝑖)  against the market’s return (i.e. 𝑟𝑚):  
𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑟𝑚 + 𝜀 
With  𝛽 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖,𝑟𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑖)
 represents the slope of the straight-line fitting stock and markets’ rates of 
return, 𝛼 is a constant value (i.e. the intercept) and 𝜀 the error term. 
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If the firm is not listed in the market, we need to follow a different approach for valuing beta; 
we should take into account sector beta or beta estimated for comparable firms (i.e. peers). 
Once identified, we should extrapolate the financial risk included in such a parameter, in order 
to obtain an indicator of the operating risk exclusively (i.e. beta unlevered). The following 
formula allows getting estimates of unlevered beta from levered beta, based on market 
observations:  
𝛽𝑢 =
𝛽𝑙
1 + (
𝐷
𝐸) ∗ (1 − 𝜏)
 
Form the unlevered beta of all firms belonging to a specific sector it is possible to find out the 
sector unlevered beta, known as Business Risk Index (BRI). From such an index, we can derive 
the beta of each firm that is not listed, considering its target financial structure:  
𝛽 = 𝐵𝑅𝐼 + 𝐵𝑅𝐼 ∗ (1 − 𝜏) ∗
𝐷
𝐸
 
Where the ratio 
𝐷
𝐸 
 is computed from market multiples of comparable or companies in the same 
sector.  
Beta estimates enter the CAPM formula for computing the cost of equity in the following way: 
𝑟𝐸 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
Where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate and 𝑟𝑚 is the rate of return of the market portfolio. As a proxy for 
the latter, we can consider the S&P 500 index. The difference between the market and the risk-
free rate consists of the extra yield of return asked by investors and it is known as market (i.e. 
systematic) risk premium. The latter can be computed by taking into account the historical 
average of the market excess return with respect to the risk-free rate, especially for firms that 
are not listed. Alternatively, given an analysis of future expected cash flows, it is possible to 
estimate the expected market return by determining the discount rate that is coherent with the 
actual value of the index. Such an approach based on fundamental usually requires the 
assumption of a constant growth in the future.  
Alternative models to the CAPM for estimating the cost of equity include the Fama and French 
Three-Factor model and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) model as well. These models differ 
mainly on risk definition; the CAPM approach defines risk as stocks sensitivity to the market 
portfolio, while Fama and French (1992) measure stocks sensitivity with respect to three 
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portfolios: the market portfolio, a portfolio based on firm size, and a portfolio founded on book-
to-market ratios1. 
In order to approximate the after tax cost of debt, Koller (2010) suggests employing the after-
tax yield to maturity on companies’ long-term debt. For companies with publicly traded debt, 
the yield to maturity can be calculated directly from the bond’s price and promised cash flows. 
It is technically considered as a proxy for the expected return on company’s debt, but it is 
actually a promised rate of return, which founds on the assumption that all coupon payments 
are made on time and debt is totally paid. Consequently, it is a valid proxy for the cost of debt 
only for companies with investment-grade debt rated BBB or better, in correspondence to low 
levels of default probabilities. For companies whose debt trade infrequently, it is better to take 
into account debt rating to estimate the yield to maturity. Professional rating agencies, such as 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s provide such a rate, which is freely available to the 
public and can be downloaded from web sites. From firm’s rating is therefore possible to derive 
a measure for the default spread that should be added to the risk-free rate to get an estimate of 
the cost of debt. If the firm is not listed, the default spread can be extrapolated from a synthetic 
rating. Damodaran (2014) suggests a synthetic rating based on firms’ interest coverage ratio: 
EBIT/Interest Expenses. A more realistic approach would employ multiple ratios rather than a 
single one to set a score for estimating ratings. Anyway, the synthetic rating process would 
deliver reasonably close ratings for any firms. The model proposed is the following:  
 
Source: Damodaran (2014) 
 
                                                          
1 For further information about this topic refer to Fama E. F. and French K. R. (1992) 
> ≤ Rating Spread
-100000 0,50 D 12,00%
0,5 0,80 C 10,50%
0,8 1,25 CC 9,50%
1,25 1,50 CCC 8,75%
1,5 2,00 B- 7,25%
2 2,50 B 6,50%
2,5 3,00 B+ 5,50%
3 3,50 BB 4,00%
3,5 4,00 BB+ 3,00%
4 4,50 BBB 2,00%
4,5 6,00 A- 1,30%
6 7,50 A 1,00%
7,5 9,50 A+ 0,85%
9,5 12,50 AA 0,70%
12,5 100000,0 AAA 0,40%
 EBIT/IE
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For example, if the EBIT/IE ratio of the company is equal to 0,68 the associated rating 
according to the previous table is C and the spread amount to 10,5%. If the risk-free rate is 
equal to 0,5%, we will obtain a cost of debt equal to 11% (i.e. 10,5% + 0,5%).  
According to Koller et al. (2010), the CAPM is the best approach we should follow if we want 
to estimate the cost of equity developing the WACC. Almost three years later, Jennergren 
(2013) recognises that even if poor, the CAPM is widely used for valuing companies and 
estimating the cost of equity capital. A possible explanation can be attributed to the fact that 
errors in cash flow estimates have probably a greater impact on firms’ value than some 
discrepancies in the cost of capital. Moreover, it is an approach based on robust and few 
parameters. Unfortunately, we cannot conclude that the original version of such a methodology 
is the most appropriate to value distressed firms, since it tends to underestimate the risk of 
default. In addition, the WACC takes into account target weights (D/V and E/V), rather than 
current weights: if we expect the rebalancing will happen over a significant period (i.e. over the 
projection period in our case), we should employ a different cost of capital every year in order 
to be coherent with the capital structure each time. In practice, we should correctly model 
weights and changes in the cost of equity and debt. In case of extreme fluctuations in capital 
structures, the DCF approach with constant WACC as discount factor can lead to significant 
errors. Determining the correct discount factor for firms in financial troubles is surely a 
challenging task: different approaches to this problem have been proposed over time.  
Among them, Damodaran (2006) supports the idea that distress event is often ignored in credit 
valuation, and the assumption about firm’s ability to meets its financial obligations is often 
unrealistic. The author therefore proposes a different approach for estimating discount rates, 
which does not base on regression beta2. Regression betas are usually involved for the cost of 
equity computation, while the cost of debt is derived by observing market interest rates or the 
interest rates on bonds already issued by the company itself. However, by considering 
regression betas, we take into account past prices over a long period (i.e. from two to five years) 
and distress events over short periods, underestimating the probability of distress. In other 
words, it can be the case that we estimate betas using two years of data, but the effects of distress 
on stock prices and debt-to-equity ratios are observable only in the last fraction of the regression 
period.  
                                                          
2 We remember that betas in literature are considered as proxies for risk.  
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Hence, Damodaran (2006) identifies two alternatives to regression beta estimates: the CAPM 
beta adjusted for distress and the Distress Factor Model. The author aspires to value firms in 
financial troubles by means of approaches that are clear and relatively easy to implement. 
Indeed, they are appealing for analysts, even if they do not take into account the probability of 
distress in the discount factor correctly.  
Almeida and Philippon (2007) complain that the “correct” discount factor incorporating true 
risk and uncertainty about firm’s future framework is very complicated to compute. They 
deviate the problem by adjusting the probability that distress actually occurs. They propose a 
way to incorporate systematic risk into default probability by using risk premia that are implicit 
in corporate yield spreads. By assuming that financial distress costs are more likely to occur in 
states of nature where bonds default, corporate bond prices can be used to estimate the distress-
risk adjustment. It is possible to observe that actual spreads are greater than if they, conversely, 
would have been implied by historical default rates and that almost part of the additional premia 
reflects a systematic risk premium. From such spreads, we can derive a risk-neutral market 
implied probability of default that can be employed to estimate financial distress costs. In doing 
so, a tree valuation can be useful to illustrate the payoff to bond holders, considering a certain 
probability that a firm will default each year. In such a manner, we want to value the distress 
costs for a firm that has issued an annual-coupon bond maturing in one year, which is priced at 
par and promises a yield equal to y. The recovery rate is certain today and it is expressed by ρ. 
Therefore, in case of default on bond, creditors can recover an amount equal to ρ(1+ y). The 
actual value of the bond is determined by discounting the expected future cash flows generated, 
adjusted for the systemic risk of default. If q is the risk-adjusted probability of default in one 
year, the bond value can be defined as follows:  
1 =
(1 − 𝑞)(1 + 𝑦) + 𝑞𝜌(1 + 𝑦)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
 
Where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate. The default risk premium is therefore included in the probability 
of default q and it can be represented by the difference between the promised yield on bond and 
the risk-free rate. The risk-adjusted probability of default is certainly higher than the risk neutral 
one and it can be defined in this manner:  
𝑞 =
𝑦 − 𝑟𝑓
(1 + 𝑦) ∗ (1 − 𝜌)
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It is possible to perform a tree analysis for the cost of distress as well. In case of default, the 
loss in value is included in φ and it is assumed certain at the time of valuation. Obviously, if 
the firm is able to avoid default on its obligations, the loss in value is 0. Φ is the actual value of 
financial distress costs and it is given by:  
Φ =
𝑞φ + (1 − q)0
1 + 𝑟𝑓
 
Following such an approach, we are able to derive risk-adjusted probabilities of financial 
distress from yield spreads and recovery rates, without taking into account historical default 
probabilities, which usually have few predictive power in our valuation.  
As a company comes under distress, its bonds fluctuate down the credit spectrum and 
consequently the expected default frequencies begin to rise. At some point, the risk is too high 
that default is taken as given and the price of the loan is associated to uncertainty in recovery 
values and loss given default. Such a change in the risk profile has a great influence on the price 
of credit-risky debt: the probability of default is driven primarily by the value of firms’ equity, 
since it represents the difference between enterprise values3 and debt values, which in turns 
determines the distance to default. Therefore, by taking into account the relationship between 
equity and debt values, we can employ the price of common stocks to estimate the price of 
corporate debt obligations. Changes in share prices can be useful for estimating how bond prices 
should change as the operating environment fluctuates. In some circumstances, it is better to 
estimate the price of debt obligations directly from the price of common stocks, since most 
markets do not trade in public markets with the same frequency of stocks or they are not traded 
at all. Therefore, by involving a certain interrelation between companies’ debt and equity 
securities, it is possible to value loans and securities in real time.  
At this proposal, Guthner (2012) considers a typical industrial/manufacturing company with 
only one 10-year tranche of debt outstanding. The goal is to compute the price of such a loan 
by taking into account company’s financial statements and information extracted from equity 
market as well. For example, based on a stock price of $36.50 and an implied volatility extracted 
from option prices of 40%, the resulting bond price is $98.618 and the yield to maturity is 
5.18%. The estimate probability of default over 10 years is 6.77%, which corresponds to an 
                                                          
3 The enterprise value is obtained by summing the value of operations (core business) and non-operating assets, 
such as excess cash. Once we obtain such value, we can subtract the value of debt to compute indirectly equity 
value.  
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implied credit rating Baa3/BBB-. By observing the behaviour of stock and bond prices over 
time, we can make some interesting observations. Bonds issued by the company that enjoys 
very high rating (i.e. from Aaa/AAA to A3/A-) show low sensitivity to share price. This 
behaviour is related to the fact that companies whose asset value is largely greater than debt 
value have lower potential to default over a business cycle. Therefore, moderate changes in 
equity values do not have a large impact on expected default frequencies, causing a slightly 
variation of debt value. As the credit rating falls from B to BBB range, debt valuation is very 
responsive to changes in share prices. Companies have a higher amount of debt outstanding 
with respect to those in the high end of the investment-grade arena. Consequently, a change in 
the share price has a greater impact on firm’s capital structure on a marked-value basis. If equity 
value tends to decline over time, the “cushion” that is a protection for creditors against the 
erosion in their collateral values reduces as well, causing an increase in the probability of 
default. Consequently, company’s debt begins to assume some equity characteristics. If we 
consider levels of credit rating lower than CCC, financial distress and expected default 
frequencies are very high. As default becomes certain and the value of firm’s debt drops 
significantly, the latter begins to assume the characteristics of a defaulted security. Debt values 
translates to loan estimated recovery values in a default scenario. Therefore, changes in equity 
prices may influence the probability of default but do not affect the value of distressed debt. At 
default, loss given default and uncertainty related to its estimates drive the value of firm’s debt, 
which trades at a discount with respect to its expected amount. The previous analysis can be 
further extended to include the possibility that default may occur not only at the end of the first 
year, but rather in future years as well, assuming that the risk-adjusted probability of default 
and the risk-free rate do not change over time even if this is counterfactual and not met in reality.  
A different approach for valuing distressed firms has been proposed by Jennergren (2013). Sales 
revenues are the driving variable, bankruptcy risk and other sources of uncertainty are 
considered explicitly. The object of valuation is an unlevered firm whose revenues over time 
are represented by a tree diagram. A node defines each year of valuation. At the end of each 
year, it is possible to distinguish among at least three states of nature. The first state is 
characterised by a jump in sales revenues that is captured by a multiplicative up factor 𝑢𝑡 > 1 
and a pretty good market rate of return 𝑀1. A probability p is associated to such state of nature 
and it is supposed constant over time. The second state of nature is characterised by a moderate 
jump in sale revenues 𝑚𝑡 < 1 and a fairly bad market rate of return 𝑀2. Therefore, with a 
probability q, the value of firm’s sales after a year could be 𝑆1 = 𝑚1 ∗ 𝑆0, where 𝑆0 is the actual 
27 
 
value of firm sales. To the third state of nature, the associate probability is given by difference 
(i.e. 1 - p – q) and it is the worst one for the firm and economy as a whole: there is a bankruptcy 
down jump d = 0, leading to revenues closed to 0. Moreover, the market rate of return is quite 
bad and even lower with respect to the intermediate step (i.e.  𝑀3 <  𝑀2). It is discounting back 
all the nodes in the tree that we can determine the value of the unlevered target. By considering 
this approach, as we following figure shows, cash flows in each node depend on three main 
factors: period of valuation, sales revenue and type of jump in relation to the state of nature 
where the company moves. Once we obtain an estimate of the unlevered firm value, the value 
of the levered firm can be therefore obtained in three methods: as the sum of the unlevered 
value and the tax shields, as the sum of debt and equity values or discounting cash flow by 
levered WACC.  
 
Source: Jennergren (2013) 
 
Discount rates in this model are derived from the CAPM taking into account some basic 
parameters: the risk-free rate, the jump probabilities p and q, the market rate of return 
characterising each state of nature, other than jump factors. 
According to Damodaran (2010), there seems to be at least two excuses for not considering the 
event of distress explicitly. Some analysts believe that discounted cash flow valuations already 
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include the effect of distress both in discount rates and in cash flows determination, but such 
inclusion is hidden somewhere, it is not explicit. When we use expected cash flows that already 
incorporate the probability of distress and discount rates adjusted for a high risk of distress, 
there is not a material impact on value with respect to approaches that consider the distress 
event explicitly. The main point is therefore computing financial forecasts in an accurate 
fashion. The valuation model proposed earlier can be criticised for its simplicity: three possible 
states of nature for every node are not enough to describe all the possible events that can happen 
in the real world. Moreover, it simplifies the process that leads into bankruptcy, by assuming 
that such event occurs with a fixed probability every year. This means that, bankruptcy is not 
more likely to occur after a number of previous bad years as it usually happens in reality; it is 
reasonable to let bankruptcy depending on preceding firms past history.  
Finally, Meitner and Streitferdt (2014) propose a recent valuation method for distressed 
companies where the economic landscape is characterised by a deep world recession and severe 
operating problems, such as low or negative cash flows. As other practitioners, they find some 
difficulties in determining the right beta to include in the determination of risk-adjusted 
discount rated according to the CAPM. Historical data are not very useful since they usually 
refer to normal business circumstances and consequently generate significant valuation errors. 
In order to value a company in financial troubles, we can involve two approaches that allow 
taking into account for uncertainty explicitly: the risk-adjusted discount rate and the certainty 
equivalent approach. According to the former, risk is considered in the denominator of the 
valuation formula: the actual firm value is computed by discounting expected cash flows during 
and after the projection period at the risk-free rate plus a risk-adjustment factor that takes into 
account the specific firm’s financial conditions and the situation of the economy as a whole. 
On the other side, the certainty equivalent approach takes into account risk in the numerator of 
the valuation formula. With respect to the CAPM environment, both approaches can be applied 
when dealing with distressed firms. For simplicity, we will consider two time intervals: t = 0, 
that represents the actual valuation date and t = 1 that stands for a certain period in the future. 
According to the DCF approach, we need an estimate of the expected cash flows generated by 
the firm during the projection period and an estimate of its continuing value as well; they will 
determine the numerator of our valuation formula. 
Following the risk-adjusted discount rate approach, the risk-free rate is adjusted by multiplying 
beta (as a relevant measure of risk) for the market risk premium. Analytically, we can write the 
expression of firm’s value as follows:  
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𝑉0 =
𝐸(𝐶𝐹1) + 𝐸(𝐶𝑉1)
1 + 𝑟𝑓 + 𝑧
 
Where z is the risk-adjustment to the discount rate. The latter can be expressed as a function of 
firm’s beta (𝛽𝑖) and the market risk premium (𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓): 
 
𝑉0 =
𝐸(𝐶𝐹1) + 𝐸(𝐶𝑉1)
1 + 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ (𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓)
 
The previous formula can be reformulated by taking into account the traditional CAPM beta 
definition.  
Therefore, we obtain:  
𝑉0 =
𝐸(𝐶𝐹1) + 𝐸(𝐶𝑉1)
1 + 𝑟𝑓 + [
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖; 𝑟𝑚)
𝜎𝑟𝑚
2 ] ∗ (𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓)
 
Then, we use λ as expression of the market price of risk, i.e. λ =
(𝐸(𝑟𝑚)−𝑟𝑓)
𝜎𝑟𝑚
2  : 
𝑉0 =
𝐸(𝐶𝐹1) + 𝐸(𝐶𝑉1)
1 + 𝑟𝑓 + λ ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑖; 𝑟𝑚)
 
With respect to the certainty equivalent approach, we need to adjust the numerator of the 
formula. The certainty equivalent represents the amount of money that - if received with 
certainty - would make the decision-maker indifferent between receiving that amount or the 
expected but uncertain one. According to such an approach, the valuation formula becomes the 
following: 
  
𝑉0 =
𝐶𝐸(𝐶𝐹1 + 𝐶𝑉1)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
=
𝐸(𝐶𝐹1 + 𝐶𝑉1) − λ ∗ Cov(𝐶𝐹1 + 𝐶𝑉1; 𝑟𝑚)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
 
And: 
𝑉0 =
𝐶𝐸(𝐶𝐹1) + 𝐶𝐸(𝐶𝑉1)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
=
𝐸(𝐶𝐹1) − λ ∗ Cov(𝐶𝐹1; 𝑟𝑚) + 𝐸(𝐶𝑉1) − λ ∗ Cov(𝐶𝑉1; 𝑟𝑚)
1 + 𝑟𝑓
 
By imposing some assumptions on the difference between healthy-distressed firms and 
involving the findings by Modigliani and Miller (1958), we can try to find out a relationship 
30 
 
between their respective discount rates. In an ideal word where certainty reigns, the interest rate 
on bonds can be considered as a proxy for the cost of capital, regardless to the firms’ capital 
composition. While, when dealing with uncertainty, some “risk discounts” need to be subtracted 
to the expected yield, or a rather risk premium to the market rate of return should be 
incorporated.  
In identifying such a relationship, we assume that the distressed firm generates a low amount 
of cash flows; more precisely, it is computed by subtracting to the cash flows of the healthy 
firm a constant amount every year. Moreover, we assume that the cash flow reduction does not 
add relevant risk in our valuation, meaning that the CAPM-relevant risk position does not 
change only because we add financial obligations in the company. Despite the fundamental 
cash flow risk is the same for both companies, there are risk-adjusted discount rate differentials 
between distressed and healthy companies:  
𝑟𝐷 = 𝑟𝐻 + (𝑟𝐻 − 𝑟𝑓) ∗
𝐷0
𝐷,𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑉0
𝐷  
Where 𝐷0
𝐷,𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
 represents the market value of “virtual risk-free debt” and 𝑉0
𝐷 the value of the 
distressed company in t = 0. Consequently, it seems possible determining the actual value of a 
distressed firm from both the actual value of a healthy firm and the market value of “virtual 
risk-free debt” in the following way:  
𝑉0
𝐷 = 𝑉0
𝐻 − 𝐷0
𝐷,𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
 
Anyway, in reality we know that distressed companies exhibit quite different cash flows risk 
structures with respect to healthy entities. Therefore, the difference between values of healthy 
firms and distressed firms is not risk-free, but there is a rather certain amount of risk that can 
be represented in mathematical terms by a non-negative correlation between the cash flow 
difference and the market rate of return. Consequently, we need to adjust the relationship 
between discount rates for distressed and healthy firms in this way:  
𝑟𝐷 = 𝑟𝐻 + (𝑟𝐻 − 𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡) ∗
𝐷0
𝐷,𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝑉0
𝐷  
Where 𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 is the CAPM-relevant cost of the “virtual debt” in the distressed company. 
After recognising that distressed and healthy companies show different cash flow risk, we face 
a computational problem: differently from financial debt, the “virtual cost” of debt cannot be 
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computed directly since it is not observable. A different approach for discount rates 
determination should therefore be pursued by analysts when valuing firms with financial 
troubles. A good practice involves a deep analysis of the risk profile of the company, reminding 
that distressed companies are normally characterized by low or even negative cash flows. 
According to this, Meitner and Streitferdt (2014) provide some examples, but almost all of them 
assume the same fundamental cash flow risk for distressed and healthy companies, determining 
the rate of return on virtual debt directly.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Option Pricing Theory and Merton’s model   
2.1 The assumptions of the model 
The Merton’s model tackles the problem of pricing and hedging a European option (call or put) 
on a non-dividend paying stock4. It forms the benchmark model for pricing options on a variety 
of underlying assets including equities, equity indices, currencies, and futures. The assumptions 
of the model follow directly those made by Black and Scholes (1973). They are in a certain 
sense “ideal” and simplistic, starting from the assumption that asset prices follow a Geometric 
Brownian motion with known mean and variance. Thus, the evolution of asset prices over time 
can be described by a normal distribution5. In this pricing model, the Modigliani and Miller 
theorem is valid; thus, the value of the firm is independent from its capital structure6, the interest 
rate is constant and it is risk-free. There is a sufficient number of investors with more or less 
the same wealth, so they can buy or sell the desired quantity of assets. Investors can borrow and 
lend at the same interest rates and they do not have any penalties in practicing the short-selling 
procedure. Trading takes place continuously and there are not arbitrage opportunities. We 
consider firms with a simple capital structure; it is composed of equity and a single issue of a 
zero coupon bond (i.e. a risk-free debt with a single maturity date T). We know that in reality 
firms have very complicated capital structures made up by different bond issues (i.e. bonds with 
different maturity, seniority, remuneration methods), convertible stocks, privileged shares and 
so on. As with all “structural models”, Merton’s model specifies how the value of a firm evolves 
over time. In fact, the economic value of firm’s assets is modelled by mean of a stochastic 
process, which allows taking into account that future assets values are uncertain:  
𝑑𝑉𝑡 = 𝑟𝑉𝑡 + 𝜎𝑉𝑡𝑑𝑊𝑡 
Where 𝑟 is the drift of the firm’s value and 𝜎 its volatility; they are both constant. 𝑑𝑊𝑡 is a 
Geometric Brownian motion (GBM). By assuming a normal (or lognormal) diffusion process 
for asset values and constant volatilities, the value of the firm’s assets at a generic time t can be 
obtained from the following formula: 
                                                          
4 Afterwards, the valuation has been extended to include a stock paying dividends, but it is not the purpose of this 
elaboration.   
5 This is a strong assumption with important implications that will be discussed later in our valuation. In reality, 
by observing the market we can state that asset prices usually jump and do not evolve continuously.  
6 In particular, the value of the firm’s assets equal the sum of debt and equity values. For further information see 
Miller M. and Modigliani F. (1958).  
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𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉0 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {(𝑟 −
𝜎2
2
) 𝑡 + 𝜎√𝑡𝑊𝑡} 
Where 𝑉0 is the initial value of the assets at time 0.  
 
2.2 The payoffs to Debt and Equity holders 
According to Merton (1974), there are no covenants triggering default before the maturity date 
on debt, whose face value is D. Thus, if at maturity T the firm’s asset value exceeds the promised 
payment D, lenders will receive the promised amount, leaving the residual asset value to 
shareholders. While, if the asset value at maturity is lower than the promised payment, lenders 
will receive a payment equal to the residual asset value and shareholders will get nothing (Hull 
et al. 2004). Thus, we can distinguish the payoffs to equity and debt holders in the following 
way: on date T, there are two possibilities: if 𝑉𝑇 ≥ 𝐷, then debt holders get the promised 
payment 𝐷; otherwise, they get the firm value they can extract at maturity T. Thanks to Merton’s 
paper (1974), we can rewrite the payoff in terms of option notations. Debt holders receive the 
min {𝑉𝑇 , 𝐷} or, in other terms, they receive: 𝐷𝑇 = 𝐷 − max  {𝐷 − 𝑉𝑇 , 0}. In this way, we 
recognise that debt holders have a long position on a default-free bond paying D at maturity 
and a short position on a put option on the firm’s value with strike price equal to the face value 
of debt at maturity. The riskiness of the zero coupon bond located in the firm’s capital structure 
is linked to the possibility that the firm’s value at maturity will be lower than the promised 
payment to debt holders. The following figure shows the payoff of debt related to asset value: 
 
Source: adapted representation of a put option 
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By involving the Put-Call parity and Sundaram (2010), the value of a firm’s risky debt (i.e. the 
market value of debt) is equal to the value of a risk-free discount bond minus the value of a put 
option. In fact, for low values of the firm, we consider the possibility to conclude an agreement 
(i.e. a reorganization or restructuring plan) between creditors and management; in other words, 
when 𝑉𝑇 < 𝐷,  debt holders are willing to accept a discount and eventually a delay on their 
promised payments, rather than declaring the firm’s bankruptcy and obtaining the liquidation 
value. They are disposed to accept such agreement if the estimated going-concern value of the 
firm is larger than the value reachable from plausible alternatives (i.e. change in ownership or 
combination with other entities and firm’s liquidation). The main point we want to stress 
through this valuation is that, in a distress situation, the nominal and economic value of debt 
are usually different, while these values tend to converge in normal circumstances. By accepting 
a discount on their credits, debt holders are implicitly increasing the equity value of a firm. 
Indeed, the difference between the nominal and economic value of debt represents the price of 
a put option on debt, which in turns is a proxy of the benefits derived by shareholders thanks to 
the reorganization plan. Analytically, we can derive the following relationship:  
𝐷𝑚𝑘𝑡 = 𝐷𝑟𝑓 − (𝑃𝑢𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 
Where: 𝐷𝑟𝑓 = 𝐷 ∗ 𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡). 
𝐷𝑟𝑓 is the actual value of the sum of the cash flows expected to debt holders, as designed in the 
reorganization plan, and 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate.  
We can know determine the payoff to equity holders according to real option theory as well. If 
at maturity of firm’s obligations, the enterprise value is larger than the face value of debt (i.e. 
𝑉𝑇 > 𝐷), then shareholders will get the residual amount (𝑉𝑇 − 𝐷), in line with the Absolute 
Priority Rule7. In the worst scenario, the firms do not have enough proceeds to reimburse the 
promised amount debt holders, leaving equity holders without any money in their pocket. 
According to real option theory, the payoff to equity holders can be therefore replicated by 
holding a long call position on the company’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value 
of debt and maturity T : 𝐸𝑇 = max  {0, 𝑉𝑇 − 𝐷}. For equity holders, it is optimal to exercise the 
                                                          
7 The Rule of Absolute Priority stipulates an order of payment -creditors before shareholders- that we assume 
being valid even before the liquidation event. By accepting the reorganization plan, creditors pretend the 
reimbursement prior to all the other claimants.  
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option as 𝑉𝑇 gets larger then D; as a matter of facts, they have enough proceeds to repay debt 
holders, keeping the residual for themselves. The payoff distribution as explained before is in 
line with the common attribution of the firm’s ownership and control: it is usual to attribute the 
ownership of the firm to creditors, while shareholders hold a call option of the firm’s assets.  
 
 
Source: adapted representation of a call option 
 
2.3 Equity as a Call Option on firm assets 
By recognising the presence of real options in the payoff to equity and debt holders, we are 
allowed to employ the Black-Scholes and Merton’s model for the computation of the firm value. 
At the beginning of his pricing valuation, Merton (1974) focuses his attention on the Black and 
Scholes formula:  
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑒−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑2) 
 
With the boundary condition: 𝐶 = max(0, 𝑆 − 𝐾) at expiration and  
 
𝑑1 =
{log[
𝑆
𝐾
]+(𝑟𝑓−𝑦+
1
2
𝜎𝑠
2)(𝑇−𝑡)}
𝜎𝑠√(𝑇−𝑡)
  and  𝑑2 = 𝑑1𝜎𝑠√(𝑇 − 𝑡).  
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Where C is the price of a call option on company stock, S is the price of the stock, K is the strike 
price, y is the dividend yield8, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate, 𝜎𝑠 is the standard deviation of stock returns 
and N(•) the cumulative standard normal distribution function9.  
In his paper, Merton (1974) proposes an adjusted version of the previous formula, as a function 
of the firm’s value (i.e. V) and the face value of debt:  
𝐸 = 𝑉𝑒−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐷𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑2) 
Where 
 
𝑑1 =
{log[
𝑉
𝐷
]+(𝑟𝑓−𝑦+
1
2
𝜎𝑉
2)(𝑇−𝑡)}
𝜎𝑉√(𝑇−𝑡)
  and  𝑑2 = 𝑑1 𝜎𝑉√(𝑇 − 𝑡). 
 
The boundary condition is still the same (i.e. we are still considering a call option), E is the 
equity value of the firm, V the value of the firm’s assets, D the face value of debt, y the dividend 
yield and 𝜎𝑉 in the standard deviation of the enterprise value. 
We can observe the differences from the original Black and Scholes formula: the underlying 
price consists in the value of the firm’s assets, the strike price is given by the face value of debt 
at maturity10 and the standard deviation of the asset returns (i.e. 𝜎𝑉)  replaces the standard 
deviation on equity returns. In fact, as Guthner (2012) points out in his valuation, option-pricing 
models referring to the value of the firm’s assets as state variable should no longer take into 
account the volatility of stock return but rather the volatility of asset returns.  
 
2.3.1 From the volatility of Equity returns to the volatility of Asset returns 
The closed-form option pricing formula derived by Merton (1974) offers a new theoretical 
approach for valuing risky debt, which combines option pricing theory and corporate finance 
theorems. Such an approach is appealing for valuing risky assets with only a small set of 
variables. Almost all the parameters involved in the valuation can be observed from the market 
(such as the risk-free rate) or firm’s financial statements (such as the face value of debt). The 
                                                          
8 We assume that the dividend rate is 0, but the valuation can be extended by assuming a positive dividend yield. 
9 𝑁(•) =
1
√2𝜋
∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
1
2
𝑧2] 𝑑𝑧
𝑋
−∞
, 
 
10 We remember that Merton does not involve the possibility of default prior the maturity of the bond.  
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two unknown variables are the market value of the firm’s assets and the value of assets’ standard 
deviation; the latter is included in 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 of Merton’s formula. For the first unknown we 
have already proposed a solution: thanks to the DCF model, we compute the actual value of the 
firm’s assets as the sum of the present value of the expected cash flows generated during the 
projection period and the CV, using proper discount rates. The major problem consists in 
estimating assets’ standard deviation: the enterprise value is not quoted in the market, 
differently from the equity, impeding the computation of 𝜎𝑉 in a standard fashion. A feasible 
solution for a listed firm is an estimate of standard deviation (or volatility) of asset returns as a 
function of standard deviation of equity returns, by solving the preceding Black and Scholes 
formula in reverse. In other words, if we assume that the price of equity and thus the price of 
the call option are correct, we can compute an estimate of implied equity volatility from those 
prices. Once we have an estimate of the implied equity volatility, we can compute an option 
price and compare it with the market price of such option. If the resulting price is above the 
market price, we should obtain a second estimate of the implied volatility that is lower than the 
first one. Conversely, if the price obtained by applying the model is lower that the market price, 
we try with a higher estimate of volatility. The process continues until we obtain a price for the 
call option equals to the market price of such option. Implied volatility determined in this 
method allows having a forward-looking estimate of future equity and asset volatility, which 
can be different from realized historical volatility. In case of non-listed firm, this approach can 
be applied with reference to some (at least one) comparable listed firm. 
We should explain the relationship between equity and asset volatility before computing the 
volatility of asset returns; in doing so, we involve option pricing theory and Black-Scholes and 
Merton’s model as well. According to the previous literature, equity value can be considered as 
a function of the firm’s value and time11, given that it behaves like a call option on the enterprise 
value: 𝐸 = 𝑓(𝑉, 𝑡). Then, by applying Ito’s formula, we can derive the dynamics of equity 
through time in the following way:  
𝑑𝐸 =
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑡
𝑑𝑡 +
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑉
𝑑𝑉 +
1
2
𝜕2𝐸
𝜕𝑉2
𝑑 < 𝑉 > 
= [
𝜕𝑓(𝑉, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑓(𝑉, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑉
∗ 𝑉 ∗ 𝑟 +
1
2
𝜕2𝑓(𝑉, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑉2
(𝑉 ∗ 𝜎𝑉)
2] 𝑑𝑡 
                                                          
11 As explained earlier, equity behaviour can be approximated by a call option on the enterprise value and debt 
behaviour like a put option on the same underlying asset. 
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+
𝜕𝑓(𝑉, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑉
∗ 𝑉 ∗ 𝜎𝑉 ∗ 𝑑𝑊𝑡 
We are interested in the stochastic components of equity dynamics: 
𝜕𝑓(𝑉,𝑡)
𝜕𝑉
∗ 𝑉 ∗ 𝜎𝑉 ∗ 𝑑𝑊𝑡, that 
allows obtaining a closed-form expression for equity standard deviation (or volatility). Thus, 
we can set 𝑑𝑡 = 0 and divide both side of the previous equation by E: 
𝑑𝐸
𝐸
=
𝜕𝑓(𝑉, 𝑡)
𝜕𝑉
∗
𝑉
𝐸
𝜎𝑉 ∗ 𝑑𝑊𝑡 
Then, by substituting 
𝑑𝐸
𝐸
 with 𝜎𝐸 ∗ 𝑑𝑊12𝑡, we can simplify the equation and obtain the final 
result: 
𝜎𝐸 =
𝜕𝑓(𝑉,𝑡)
𝜕𝑉
∗
𝑉
𝐸
∗ 𝜎𝑉. 
Professionals recognise that 
𝜕𝑓(𝑉,𝑡)
𝜕𝑉
 = 
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑉
 is the sensitivity of firm’s equity with respect to 
changes in firm’s value; the ratio is known as the delta of an option, which in turns is equal to 
𝑁(𝑑1),  we have found in deriving the Black and Scholes equation do far. We can therefore 
rewrite the previous formula in this way: 
𝜎𝐸 = 𝑁(𝑑1)  ∗
𝑉
𝐸
∗ 𝜎𝑉 
We can observe that standard deviation of equity returns depends linearly on standard deviation 
of the asset returns, firm’s leverage and sensitivity of equity value to changes in asset value (in 
a percentage term). It depends on time to maturity as well, since it is included in 𝑑1 formulation. 
The previous equation is useful to obtain both implied and historical asset volatility; in fact, it 
can be rearranged to express the value of the asset standard deviation as follows: 
𝜎𝑉 = 𝜎𝐸 ∗
𝐸
𝑉
∗
1
𝑁(𝑑1)
 
The main difference between implied and historical asset volatility is that the latter is computed 
from historical equity volatility, and thus it is a function of past data.  
  
                                                          
12 Equity is a call option on the firm’s assets, which follows a stochastic process driven by a GBM, thus we can 
rewrite the dynamics of E in a similar way, assuming 𝑑𝑡 = 0. 
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2.3.2 Black-Scholes-Merton’s volatility limitations and possible solutions 
Merton’s volatility involves some important limitations that compromise our estimates. The 
strictest assumption characterising Black-Scholes and Merton’s model is probably the one 
associated to constant volatilities. If we assume the option pricing correct, n call options with 
the same underlying assets but different strike prices are likely to share the same value of 
implied volatility, which is employed in the valuation formula. Nevertheless, we can observe 
from the market that options on the same underlying securities but with different strike values 
and expiration times yield different values of implied volatility. This finding is not achieved 
with traditional valuation techniques, since implied volatilities can be represented graphically 
as flat lines, independently from the value of strike prices. In reality, representations of implied 
volatility show some skewness13, which is especially justified by the presence of the firm’s 
leverage. Another volatility shape that differs from the original pricing assumption is termed 
“volatility smile”: a symmetric distribution similar to a smile as shown in the figure below, 
which suggests that implied volatility has a positive concavity with respect to the strike price. 
Consequently, estimates of implied volatilities employed in Merton model tend to be biased 
and distorted with respect to market experience.  
 
Source: www.theoptionsguide.com 
 
                                                          
13 According to Corrado and Su (1997) a volatility skew is a pattern that results from calculating implied volatilities 
across a range of strike prices for a certain class of options (i.e. put or call options). 
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By observing the market, it is clear that asset volatility fluctuates over time: there are periods 
with very low or rather very high volatility and it is difficult to understand if the firm faces the 
first or the second scenario. In order to improve the option-pricing model developed by Merton 
(1974), we should incorporate the likelihood of volatility fluctuations over time. Thus, implied 
volatility should not be considered as a deterministic (i.e. constant) number, but rather as a 
random variable that changes with time. Stochastic asset volatilities can be obtained by 
introducing a stochastic volatility model in which the value of a contingent claim depends 
mainly on the randomness characterizing future values of firm’s assets and its volatility. A 
popular model dealing with stochastic volatility is the Heston one (1993). Heston develops 
Black-Scholes and Merton patterns by taking into account stochastic volatilities and a different 
price distribution. He exploits the correlation between volatility and spot asset returns, which 
seems relevant in explaining return skewness and strike price bias in the Black-Scholes and 
Merton model. Following Gatheral and Lynch opinion (2004), stochastic volatilities models 
allow to explain consistently why stocks with different strike prices and maturities have 
different implied volatilities. By looking at the distribution of stock price returns, we can 
observe that it is highly peaked and fat tailed relative to a normal distribution. Effectively, the 
market usually attributes higher probabilities to extreme events with respect to a normal 
distribution, leading to higher probabilities of the default for firms. Empirical studies confirm 
that even assets’ log-return distribution is not normal, but rather shows heavy tails and high 
peaks (leptokurtic); such behaviour justifies the relation between equity and asset returns, which 
in turns drives equity and asset volatilities. However, if we abandon the normality assumption 
of asset distribution over time, we cannot derive a formula for asset return volatility as a 
function of equity volatility and firm’s leverage. Moreover, we cannot obtain a closed-form 
solution for option prices anymore. We can therefore conclude that a stochastic volatility model 
can solve the problem associated to constant volatilities but, on the other side, it complicates 
our estimates of asset returns volatilities. Rather than considering stochastic volatilities, we can 
focus our attention on historical estimates of volatility. Indeed, we need to take into account the 
returns achieved by debt and equity in the past. With respect to debt returns, we refer to time-
series data of prices and accrual interests on debt, while we consider data of prices and dividends 
for equity returns. From these data, we calculate the standard deviation of each financial asset, 
taking into account the correlation of returns: in fact, we expect to have a positive correlation 
between debt and equity securities as their price tend to rise with the enterprise value. In 
practice, the correlation between debt and equity is less than perfect (i.e. lower than 1.0), 
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especially in case of operational and financial restructuring14. Given the estimates of debt and 
equity volatilities, we can compute the volatility of the enterprise value as a weighted average, 
where the weights consist in the fraction of debt and equity outstanding on a market-value basis: 
 
𝜎𝑉
2 = 𝑥𝐸
2𝜎𝐸
2 + (1 − 𝑥𝐸)
2𝜎𝐷
2 + 2𝜌𝐸.𝐷𝜎𝐸𝜎𝐷𝑥𝐸(1 − 𝑥𝐸) 
 
𝑥𝐸 is the fraction of the firm capital structure represented by equity (i.e. 𝑥𝐸 = E / E+D) and 
(1 − 𝑥𝐸) by debt, 𝜎𝐸 and 𝜎𝐷 are respectively the standard deviations of debt and equity returns. 
The historical correlation of debt and equity returns is thus represented by 𝜌𝐸.𝐷. Such a solution 
has some restrictions as well: historical values of debt and equity returns lead only to a 
backward-looking valuation, rather than a forward-looking one. Furthermore, it is difficult to 
determine exactly a value for the correlation between debt and equity returns. On the other side, 
it allows us abandoning the hypothesis of normality of equity and asset returns. 
 
2.3.3 Final considerations about volatility estimates   
After a deep investigation about the methods for the computation of firms’ volatility, we can 
conclude that a more precise estimate - following the findings of Correia et al. (2015) - derives 
from a combination of: 
a) Historical volatility of returns; 
b) Implied volatility from equity options 
c) Firm’s financial statements. 
It can be shown that a mixture of the three methodologies improves the explanatory power of 
corporate bankruptcy models, when dealing with publicly traded companies. If companies are 
not listed, valuation procedures cannot take into account quoted equity prices but rather only 
historical financial performances or comparable companies. From such data, analysts try to 
compute an estimate of firm’s asset volatility by distinguished among different industries, 
sectors. They take into account a set of drivers influencing asset volatility, which includes 
systemic and company specific factors as well. Among the systemic factors we can identify the 
                                                          
14 Restructuring can involve transferring value from shareholders to bondholders or vice versa. While, in case of 
takeovers, shareholders tend to benefit more than bondholders. For further information, see Guthner M. W. 2012. 
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business in which the firm operates and the economic cycle. While, among the company 
specific factors there are the stability and the quality of the management, the relationship 
between labours and management, changes in business strategy and so on.  
In credit markets, total volatility plays a central role: despite the source of volatility can be 
systematic or idiosyncratic, it is critical to measure both in order to investigate whether future 
asset values will fall below a certain default threshold. Consequently, if we limit measures of 
asset volatility only to systematic sources, we will generate inferior estimates of default 
probabilities. Using a large sample of firms belonging to different sectors with liquid corporate 
bond data, the mixing of information about volatility from market and accounting based sources 
allows improving estimates of corporate bankruptcy with respect to situations in which only 
market based values are taken into account. A naïf measure of historical asset volatility is 
obtained as a function of historical equity volatility (𝜎𝐸) multiplied by the ratio of market value 
of firm’s equity to the book value of debt (𝜔), which allows de-leveraging historical equity 
volatility: 
𝜎𝑉
𝑁𝐴𝐼𝑉𝐸 = 𝜎𝐸 ∗ 𝜔 
A second estimate of historical asset volatility combines historical credit and equity market data 
and it is obtained according the formula shown in the previous paragraph: 
𝜎𝑉
𝜔 = √𝜔2𝜎𝐸
2 + (1 − 𝜔)2𝜎𝐷
2 + 2𝜌𝐸.𝐷𝜎𝐸𝜎𝐷𝜔(1 − 𝜔) 
Where 𝜔 is defined as the fraction of asset value attributable to equity, 𝜎𝐷 is the annualised 
standard deviation of total monthly bond returns and 𝜌𝐸.𝐷 is an estimate of the historical 
correlation between equity and debt returns. Implied volatility estimates (i.e. forward looking 
estimates of volatilities) are computed by considering Black-Scholes and Merton’s models and 
therefore at-the-money call and put options. Even in this case, we can compute two asset 
volatility estimates based on implied volatilities following the approaches described earlier. 
With respect to the accountable approach for measuring asset volatility, an average of the 
returns on net operating assets are taken into account, since they are considered as a measure 
of enterprise profitability. By regressing the probability of firm’s default on those different 
estimates of asset volatility, it is possible to observe that each of them is significantly positively 
correlated to the probability of bankruptcy: if market or fundamental based volatility increases, 
credit spread increases too, after controlling for leverage. In addition, Correia et al. (2015) 
provide models that allow to examine the combination of different component measures of asset 
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volatility, such as equity volatility or implied volatility (given the fact they are correlated they 
should not be considered in pairs in order to avoid correlation problems), volatility from credit 
markets and fundamental volatility. When models take into account all the sources of asset 
volatility for determining the likelihood of bankruptcy, the resulting goodness of fit (i.e. R^2) 
is higher with respect to the case in which only equity volatility is taken into account. Therefore, 
it turns out that a combination of market and accounting based measures of volatility provides 
superior results with respect to each source considered alone.  
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CHAPTER THREE: The Reorganization Plan 
3.1 Introduction 
As more and more firms defaulted on their debts or filed for bankruptcy in the recent recession, 
there is an increasing interest in understanding how firms can deal with distressed situations. 
Different mechanisms have been introduced over time in order to overcome firms’ financial 
difficulties. The academic literature has identified different possible solutions and at the same 
time, according to Kose (2001), investors have become increasingly concerned about default 
risk and valuation of distressed securities. Anyway, in his opinion, there is already an extensive 
literature related to financial distress management, whereas valuations of distressed securities 
in troubled reorganization have not been developed completely until that time. In general terms, 
all the possible solutions to financial crisis can be classified as private (i.e. informal) or Court-
supervised (i.e. formal) insolvency procedures. Each of them has associated advantages and 
disadvantages that will be discussed in the following paragraph. 
Previous researchers in this field provide different suggestions to financial distressed companies 
to join a resolution. Referring to this, Asquith and al. (1994) take into account the restructuring 
of firms’ assets and liabilities, asset sales, mergers, capital expenditure reductions and layoffs 
on the asset side. Debt reorganization in a process letting distressed firms to modify outstanding 
debt contracts (with the consent of creditors) in order to reduce their exposure and improve 
capital conditions; it can require a reduction of promised interests or principal payments, 
maturity extensions or the placement of new equity securities among creditors. With respect to 
partial sell-offs of existing assets for distress resolution, managers can benefit from the 
acceleration of future cash flows originated by those assets and the reduction of outstanding 
firms’ obligations through the proceeds obtained as well. Anyway, by combining poor financial 
conditions and urgent need of liquidity, the bargaining power of debtors is likely to be very low 
and therefore the price they can obtain for selling the asset is moderate. In addition to the 
previous quoted alternatives, Lemma et al. (2012) consider the injection of “new money” in 
distressed firms, even if they are aware that raising money can be very complicated because of 
the high risk involved. Successful restructurings usually require debtors to access additional 
finance that allows continuing operations.  
As we will discuss later, in some circumstances there are some potential impediments to 
informal workouts; the Court intervention seems an alternative explanation for limiting the 
negative effects of distress. Even in this framework, the goal is to develop a consensual 
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restructuring with creditors while preserving firms’ value. Firms can continue to operate, debt 
payments persist, secured creditors cannot take possession of collaterals and new borrowings 
have the priority with respect to pre-bankruptcy claims. The debtor has the right to propose a 
reorganisation plan whose exclusivity period can be extended only after the Court approval. 
The Court oversees all firms’ operations as well. Almost all insolvency laws in different 
countries consider liquidation procedures where the control shifts to creditors, some assets are 
sold and firms continue to operate as going-concern. However, as Hotchkiss and al. (2008) 
highlight, there some differences in the provisions for Court-supervised reorganisations: for 
example, some countries offer few alternatives to sales of distressed firms’ assets, whereas 
others guarantee larger protections to incumbent managers and equity holders in order to 
facilitate the continuation of operations.  
When the financial situation is deeply depressed, firms usually incur into liquidation 
procedures, which have the goal to ensure that all companies’ affairs have been dealt with and 
all assets being realised. In this legal process, a liquidator is appointed to conclude the affairs 
and at the end, the firm ceases to exist. Sometimes it can be argued that firms that are not able 
to compete in the market, because of the inability of meeting obligations at maturity, as debt 
value is higher than asset value, should be removed from the marketplace.  
 
3.2 Advantages and disadvantages  
In this chapter and in our case study too, we will consider a firm in financial trouble that has 
been able to conclude a private agreement with its creditors (i.e. reorganization plan), avoiding 
the Court intervention to solve problems. When a debtor is not able to repay its debt as it comes 
due, most legal systems provide a legal mechanism to satisfy the outstanding claim holders on 
assets. Moreover, most legal mechanisms contain rules with various types of proceedings that 
allow firms to solve their financial difficulties. Among them, we can distinguish between formal 
and informal insolvency proceedings, even if they share the same restructuring goals. 
Insolvency laws govern the first proceedings, while the second ones generally involve voluntary 
negotiations between debtors and creditors. Even if they are not regulated by the law, their 
effectiveness depends on an insolvency law, which can provide incentives to the reorganization. 
In some cases, informal procedures can be complementary to formal procedures. The 
restructuring of firm’s debt through out-of-Court procedures can involve measures that 
reorganise debtor’s business (operational restructuring) other than debtor’s finance (financial 
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restructuring). They perform an important role in all insolvency systems, providing a tool for 
creditors and firms to protect their respective interests in an efficient fashion. In order to decide 
whether out-of-Court procedures are better than formal procedures, we need to consider relative 
advantages and disadvantages. According to Garrido (2012), one of the main advantage 
connected to informal procedures is their flexibility15 and ease of adoption with respect to the 
specific needs of debtor’s business. Under numerous insolvency laws, limits to provisions in 
reorganization plans can be very strict, especially if they involve a minimum credit recovery or 
a payment delay. In addition, negotiations of new securities and provisions of additional money 
are also easier to obtain through private agreements. In a framework where corporate financial 
difficulties dominate, workouts provide a quick time-response: the process is typically shorter 
and there are not delays caused by the intervention the judicial system. Consequently, it seems 
easier for the debtor to continue operations through private agreements than formal procedures, 
which are more expensive in terms of time, money and reputation.  
Following Fischer and Wahrenburg (2012) opinion, firms with viable going-concern values 
should try to pursue out-of-Court restructurings, since they cause less distortion to the business 
where they operate other than provide quicker responses to distress.  
Anyway, there are some disadvantages associated to out-of-Court procedures as well. The first 
one is associated to the difficulty in analysing the debtor’s financial and economic situation in 
a relatively short time framework. In addition, the contractual nature of the workout requires 
the consent of the target firm and therefore the shareholder’s vote, while formal procedures 
allow the liquidation of distressed firms without their consent. With respect to the target, it is 
sometimes difficult to deal with a great number of creditors and find a common solution through 
informal procedures. Empirical studies about publicly traded company in U.S. demonstrate that 
a feasible workout depends on the concentration of debt structure: firms with dispersed debt 
should adopt formal insolvency procedures, while firms with concentrated debt should prefer 
out-of-Court procedures. On this subject, Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) recognise that 
coordination problems can generate important sources of inefficiency: the target might have 
problems of under investments (i.e. it might forgo investments with positive net present value) 
or over investments (i.e. shareholders may want to increase the riskiness of cash flows). High 
indebtedness and poor financial performance are crucial features for pushing a company into 
distress. We expect highly leveraged firms with a large portion of debt due in the short-run 
                                                          
15 An example of the mentioned flexibility is related to the Absolute Priority Rule that does not apply in out-of-
Court insolvency procedures.  
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facing some time constraints in attempting to reorganize their debt through out-of-Court 
procedures. Debt structure (in terms of composition and seniority) is therefore crucial for 
determining the choice between in and out of Court procedures in the form of both debt seniority 
and composition.  
 
3.3 The contents of the Reorganization Plan  
A restructuring plan or workout should incorporate changes in the financial distressed business, 
other than debt and financial structures. According to Garrido (2012), it consists in an 
opportunity for the target to restructure its activities and adjust cash flows to the maturity of 
debt. Sometimes it can benefit from additional funds to overcome liquidity problems as well16.  
The agreement between managers and creditors can include different suggestions, such as the 
transfer of firms’ assets without changes in ownership17 or the sale of those assets with the goal 
of obtaining liquidity for the continuation of the business. Provisions regarding debt 
restructuring may differ according to the characteristics of the distressed company. They can 
be adapted to different creditors' perspectives, by distinguishing creditors who prefer a partial 
payment as soon as possible from those who are more confidential about future firm’s 
profitability and may opt for a full payment in the future. In this regard, provisions can involve 
rescheduling of payments (i.e. payment deferment), debt roll-overs (i.e. changes in maturity 
date) and alterations of interest rates as well. Debts associated to high interest rates are one of 
the most common reasons of financial distress, since the firm is not able to generate enough 
cash flows to reimburse them. Reorganization plans normally include some partial or total debt 
write-offs: creditors may agree to reduce the outstanding debt of the distressed companies 
through “hair-cuts”. In order to preserve firm survival, creditors may accept some covenant 
violations and/or alterations as well. On the other side, they can ask for the inclusion of 
additional guarantees that facilitate the reimbursement of their obligations. Therefore, firm’s 
management and creditors can agree some debt/equity swaps, debt/debt swaps and 
equity/equity swaps, allowing claim holders to obtain new debt or equity instruments.  
Generally, such agreements based on going-concern assumptions: after the accord has been 
executed, there is the possibility for the firm to continue its operations when it represents the 
best solution for the firm itself and creditors as well. Participants in insolvency procedures 
                                                          
16 We will consider the valuation of a financial distressed firm receiving injections of financial resources needed 
to continue its operations in the following case study.  
17 These assets are usually addressed to liquidation procedures. 
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should have strong incentives to achieve the maximum value from firms’ assets in order to 
guarantee maximal distributions to lenders and reduce the burden of insolvency.  
As a matter of fact, the plan proposed by the management has to include all the activities the 
firm intends to pursue in order to reduce its level of financial exposure. The plan is subject to 
creditors’ approval, which is essential for its implementation. Creditors are usually divided in 
homogeneous classes with respect to their economic interest and judicial position, allowing a 
sort of hierarchy in credits’ reimbursement. Indeed, creditors with similar legal rights should 
be treated fairly, receiving distributions that are proportional to their relative ranking and 
interests. Creditors with similar legal rights are threaten approximately the same way: for 
example, the principle of equitable treatment can be modified by the introduction of some 
priorities in repayments. When the management proposes the plan to creditors, all information 
suitable to influence the reimbursement needs to be exposed. Such information mainly involves 
the disclosure of financial statements with a focus on the activities that the firm can realise in 
the following years. By representing the previous experience of the distressed entity, financial 
statements provide a tool for better explaining current financial problems. The comparisons of 
annual ratios provide an analysis of firms’ economic and financial evolution over time and 
therefore allows developing and understanding forecasts about future profitability, which are 
crucial for plan feasibility. Other than focus the attention on of the distressed firm under 
valuation, the management needs to consider general market conditions as well. In this way, it 
is possible to identify the best strategies to implement, which enable the distressed entities to 
overcome internal and external pressures. We will take into account all this information in the 
following analysis, which is a prerequisite to our case study. 
 
3.4 The Value Drivers in the Scenario Analysis 
A scenario analysis consists in a powerful tool for developing alternative visions of the future 
in which decisions may be played out. In this specific analysis, we consider a projection period 
of five years and a subsequent period in which we suppose the firm will join a steady-state 
equilibrium where financial problems are solved. The period correspondent to t = 0 takes into 
account actual firm’s values and therefore they are the same in all scenarios. It is also considered 
the valuation date.  
A central role in such a valuation procedure is played by the FCF that the firm will be able to 
generate as going-concern during the reference period. In case of distress, a portion of the FCF 
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produced is addressed each year to the gradual reimbursement of financial obligations (i.e. 
FCD), in order to reduce, over time, the probability of default. Both FCF and FCD depend on 
estimates about some firm’s actual and forecasted value drivers, such annual growth rates on 
sales and EBITDA margins, which are driven by managers’ expectations and therefore subject 
to a certain degree of uncertainty. A way to reduce the latter is performing a scenario analysis 
that allows taking into account different future frameworks. The following example is extracted 
from Buttignon (2014) and it will help us performing our case study. By looking at the financial 
projections, we can observe that the firm is planning to reduce the value of its Net financial 
position over time: thanks to a raise in EBITDA margin, the firm is able to allocate almost an 
increasing portion of the cash flow generated to debt holders, reducing in such manner the value 
of its indebtedness. Anyway, final estimates of firm’s enterprise value obtained from forecasted 
FCF depend on the scenario we are considering. That is why we take into account three main 
scenarios: the best scenario, the base scenario and the worst one.  
The base scenario is the most prudential one: the management assumes to realise a consistent 
portion of firm’s enterprise value in order to reduce most of outstanding obligations. The 
EBITDA margin – which is a good measure of company’s profitability -   starts to increase 
gradually (i.e. by almost 1% every year during the projection period) and the annual sale growth 
starts to improve as well. In this intermediate scenario, we suppose there will be an increase in 
equity prices since the firm will reduce its exposure and reach a more stable financial path. 
Actual and expected values involved in such a scenario are represented in the following figure: 
 
 
In the downside scenario, forecasts about future profitability are more pessimistic and more 
prudential in a certain sense. The value that managers expect to extract from continuing 
operations is very low and the EBITDA margin tends to be stable and moderate over time. Such 
a scenario is the most interesting for creditors, who can be asked to convert part of their credit 
into equity, sharing part of equity risk with current shareholders, as agreed in one of the feasible 
proceeds included in the reorganization plan. In such extreme events, Guthner (2012) 
recognises that credit risk can be considered as equity risk in disguise. Given the relationship 
Base case t = 0A t = 1P t = 2P t = 3P t = 4P t = 5P CV
Sales annual growth (g) -10% -5% 0% 3% 5% 5% 1,50%
EBITDA margin 3% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
NWC/Sales 23% 24% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
CAPEX/Sales 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00%
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between capital components, especially as a consequence of a drop in firm’s value, debt and 
equity tend to support the same risk; the higher the probability of default, the higher the equity 
or credit risk faced by lenders. In the following figure, we can observe the evolution of value 
drivers over time:  
 
Finally, the best scenario is the most challenging one: the management forecasts that firm’s 
value will potentially join very high levels. If we consider that firm’s value over time can be 
represented as a normal distribution, we need to focus our attention on the right tail, where 
extremely positive values concentrate. The annual sale on growth is expected to reach a very 
high level in few years (i.e. from -10% to 6% in four years); the EBITDA margin is forecasted 
to increase fast as well (i.e. from 3% to 9% in four years). It is clear that such results are difficult 
to achieve if the firm faces heavy financial and operating problems at the time of valuation. The 
figure below shows the expected trend through time:  
 
 
This scenario analysis will help us in performing our case study, where we will consider the 
base scenario as our benchmark. We will involve values obtained in the other scenarios as well, 
in order to make some comparisons.  
 
 
 
 
 
Downside scenario t = 0A t = 1P t = 2P t = 3P t = 4P t = 5P CV
Sales annual growth (g) -10% -5% -5% -5% -4% -3% 0,50%
EBITDA margin 3% 3% 3% 4% 5% 5% 5%
NWC/Sales 23% 25% 26% 27% 27% 27% 27%
CAPEX/Sales 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00%
Best scenario t = 0A t = 1P t = 2P t = 3P t = 4P t = 5P CV
Sales annual growth (g) -10% 0% 3% 5% 6% 7% 2,00%
EBITDA margin 3% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 10%
NWC/Sales 23% 24% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
CAPEX/Sales 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00%
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Case Study 
4.1 Introduction  
Thanks to option pricing theory and the Contingent Claim Analysis (i.e. CCA), the enterprise 
value of any firms can be obtained by summing up the values of the securities included in the 
capital structure. As mentioned in the previous chapters, we suppose that asset value is driven 
by a random component to which a certain volatility measure is associated. If the latter is very 
high, the probability that asset will fall below the level necessary to meet senior debt payments 
over the horizon period increases as well. According to the CCA (which can be considered as 
an extension of the option pricing theory), debt represents a senior claim on asset value, while 
equity a junior or residual claim. In other words, debt holders benefit from reimbursement 
priority with respect to equity holders. In distressed companies, debt is risky because asset value 
may not be sufficient to reimburse promised payments in the future. In presence of default risk, 
the economic value of debt is lower than its nominal amount. In other words, the value of risky 
debt can be decomposed in a risk-free component and a put option written on firm’s assets, 
which can be considered as a proxy for the expected loss in case of depressed levels of enterprise 
value are reached. The “price” of such a put option causes a reduction in the amount of risky 
debt, as we can observe from the following relationship:  
𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦 = 𝐷𝑟𝑓 – Put Option  
As we will demonstrate analytically, an increase of the value of the put option can be derived 
by an increase in asset volatility as well.  
In our case study, we want to estimate the difference between the risk-free and the risky 
component of debt, which is captured by the value of the put option written on the enterprise 
value (i.e. Put Option = 𝐷𝑟𝑓 − 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑦), by following Merton’s model (1974). In doing so, a 
previous computational analysis and interpretation of the enterprise value of the target is 
required. The latter mainly depends on estimates of the expected future cash flows that would 
be extracted form firm’s assets, according to the value drivers included in the previous scenario 
analysis.   
Such a case study is in turn decomposed in two cases. In the first case, we follow directly the 
recommendations implicit in Merton’s model (1974): we assume that all the firm’s outstanding 
obligations can be pooled together in a single tranche of a zero coupon debt with a unique 
maturity and therefore reimbursement in the future, regardless to the fact that companies usually 
52 
 
have more complicated capital structures. In addition, a sensitivity analysis is provided in order 
to verify what happens to the value of the put option of debt as some inputs of the Merton’s 
formula (i.e. the enterprise value and asset volatility) change. In addition, such an analysis 
allows to test is the model is coherent with our expectations.  
In the second case of our analysis, we introduce a second tranche of zero coupon bond and 
therefore a second maturity date. In this way, we are able to increase the complexity of the 
capital structure, by distinguishing short-term from long-term obligations. This lets us 
supposing the company will benefit from “new finance”, i.e. the injection of new sources 
liquidity with a reimbursement priority with respect to other existing loans. Creditors who 
provide liquidity in such emergency conditions have to be satisfied before other existing 
creditors. Anyway, such an approach can be extended for valuing firms with privileged debt as 
well.  
 
4.2 The Enterprise Value of the distressed company  
When assessing firms in financial distress, value drivers characterising each scenario play an 
important role; when they are associated to the initial balance sheet, they provide consistent 
results. We know that the going-concern value of the target has been computed by summing up 
the actual value of the expected FCF and CV as well. The former is derived by applying the 
DCF model (that has to be adjusted for the probability of distress), while for the computation 
of the CV, we can distinguish two possible solutions:  
1. we can apply the growing-perpetuity formula to FCF projected in the first period after 
the forecasting one or, alternatively, we consider the underlying value drivers 
(NOPLAT, RONIC, g), assuming the firm will be able to join a steady-state equilibrium 
after the reference period; 
2. the assumption of a “normalised” equilibrium after the forecasting one enables us 
applying market multiples to forecasted financial results, such as EBIT and EBITDA 
margins. By following this alternative, we need to select carefully comparable 
companies. If there are significant differences between the target and comparable 
companies, it is difficult to quantify discounts on market multiples capturing these 
discrepancies.  
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The succeeding table shows the entire procedure followed for the computation of the firm’s 
enterprise value, where t = 0 represents the actual valuation period. The succeeding years 
include values derived from projections, in line with the value drivers estimated for the base 
scenario. 
 
 
Table 1: the EV computation through DCF method 
 
Estimates of future EBIT values are sensitive to the increasing trend in annual growth rate 
forecasted for the base scenario, as reported in the previous chapter. They are influenced by the 
expectations about the evolution of the EBITDA margin as well. Assumptions about net 
€ million t = 0A t = 1P t = 2P t = 3P t = 4P t = 5P CV
EBIT 29,50 38,90 50,31 63,87 78,54 90,65
Operating taxes -10,33 -13,62 -17,61 -22,35 -27,49 -31,73
Tax rate 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
NOPLAT 19,18 25,29 32,70 41,51 51,05 58,92
Net vorking capital variation 2,00 -9,50 -7,13 -12,23 -12,84 -4,05
Depreciation 18,00 -18,10 -18,19 -18,33 -18,55 -18,85
Gross capex -19,00 -19,00 -19,58 -20,54 -21,58 -21,90
Oprating invested capital variation 1,00 -10,40 -8,51 -14,45 -15,87 -7,09
Operating free cash flows 20,18 14,89 24,19 27,06 35,18 51,83
Cost of capital 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 12,00% 10,03%
Growth rate (g) 1,50%
Discount factor 0,89 0,80 0,71 0,64 0,57
Present value of (annual) FCF 18,01 11,87 17,22 17,20 19,96
Present value of FCF in the forecasting period 84,26
Continuing value (CV) 297,69 524,64
BEV before debt tax shield and other items 381,96 408 442 470 500 525
Tax shield on debt* 9,27
Non-recurrent extraordinary asset value** -13,21
BEV 378,02
BEV/EBITDA(t+1) 7,96
BEV/EBIT(t+1) 12,81
Non-operating assets (NOA) value 26,00
Enterprise Value (EV) 404,02
*Debt tax shield value 
Interest expenses -12,00 -12,00 -10,00 -9,00 -7,00
Tax shield rate 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00% 25,00%
Tax shield flow 3,00 3,00 2,50 2,25 1,75
Cost of capital 12,00%
Debt tax shield value 9,27
**Non-recurrent extraordinary asset value
Non-recurrent and extraordinary items -10,00 -8,00 -5,00 0,00 0,00
Tax rate 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00% 30,00%
Net cash flow -7 -5,6 -3,5 0 0
Cost of capital 12,00%
Non-recurrent and extraordinary items value -13,21
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working capital and gross capex depend on the value drivers (NWC/Sales and CAPEX/Sales) 
reported in the scenario analysis and determine the operating invested capital variation over 
time. Then forecasts of FCF are obtained each year by summing the expected variation in the 
operating invested capital and NOPLAT value. A crucial step consists in the determination of 
the cost of capital. For the projection period, it is estimated by considering the unlevered value 
of the firm. Therefore, the cost of capital employed for discounting FCF is simply given by the 
cost of equity, which is obtained by taking into account the risk-free rate (i.e. we consider the 
interest rate of a 10-year Treasury Bill as a proxy) and the sum of equity market premium and 
company specific risk premium, which is weighted by beta equity. The latter is equal to the 
value attributed to the unlevered beta, given that we assume the firm is funded only by equity. 
For the CV, the cost of capital is obtained by applying the WACC, considering that the firm is 
financed by both equity and debt. The cost of capital employed is then adjusted by using a 
discount factor that takes into account the likelihood of distress. Finally, we obtain the BEV as 
the sum of the present value of the FCF during the forecasting period and the continuing value, 
adjusted for the value of the tax shield on debt and the value of non-operating assets. A similar 
evaluation can be done by considering the value drivers charactering the best and worst 
scenarios as well; in the first case we will obtain a higher estimate of the enterprise value (i.e. 
it will be almost equal to € 157 million) while in the second case it will be lower and closed to 
€ 158 million. Such values will be employed in performing our sensitivity analysis in the 
following paragraph.   
 
4.3  CASE ONE: a unique debt reimbursement in the future 
In this first case, we assume having all the ideal conditions for applying Merton’s model (1974) 
shown earlier. According to such an approach, the cost and the value of debt are quantified at 
the overall level, therefore different creditors are pooled in a single category, regardless to the 
presence of differences in remuneration and reimbursement methods. The starting point is the 
enterprise value of the firm that we have obtained through the DCF approach. Furthermore, we 
need an estimate of the risk-free value of debt, which is obtained by discounting the cash flow 
projected to creditors at the risk-free rate, adjusted for the risk of default, considering the 
specific features of the firm under valuation and the overall economic conditions. The risk-free 
debt value obtained before is then taken into account for the computation of the nominal debt 
value at maturity, which will be our strike price in the BSM model. A proxy for debt duration 
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is obtained by computing the ratio of the total FCF per time and the actual value of risk-free 
debt.  
 
Table 2: The risk-free debt value and duration  
 
Another indispensable input of the model consists in the EV volatility estimate, which we 
suppose being equal to 35%. This means that the enterprise value is expected to fluctuate up 
and down, within the range of 35% the initial amount. With all this information in hands, we 
are therefore able to derive the BSM formula and consequently the value of the firm’s equity, 
as the value of a call option of firm’s assets:  
𝐸 = 𝐶 = 𝑉𝑒−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐷𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑2) 
 
 
 
Table 3: The computation of debt and equity values with Merton’s formula 
€ million t = 0A t = 1P t = 2P t = 3P t = 4P t = 5P
Risk-free debt value and duration 
a. Year from 0 (time) 1 2 3 4 5
b. Free cash flow to debt (FCD) 23,14 53,24 49,02 68,54 256,89
c. Risk-free rate 0,50% 0,70% 0,90% 1,10% 1,30%
d. Discount factor 1 0,99 0,97 0,96 0,94
e. PV(FCD) 23,02 52,5 47,72 65,6 240,83
f. Risk-free value of debt 429,67
g. FCF per time 23,02 105,01 143,16 262,41 1.204,13
h. Sum FCF per time 1.737,73
i. Duration (h/f) 4
€ million t = 0A
a. Enterprise value 404,02
b. Risk-free debt value 429,67
c. Debt duration (years) 4
d. Risk-free rate 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 449,22
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35%
g. d1 0,31
h. d2 -0,39
i. N(d1) 62,17%
j. N(d2) 34,83%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 101,53
l. Debt value 302,5
m. Put value 127,18
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V of the previous formula represents the estimated enterprise value of the firm under 
consideration, whereas the risk-free debt value and duration has been derived earlier in Table 
2. The strike price of our call option is the nominal debt value at maturity, which has ben 
calculated as a function of the actual value of the risk-free debt, debt duration and risk-free rate, 
according to this formula: e = bexp(cd). By applying Merton’s formula, the resulting equity 
value is € 101,53 million. Such a value is then subtracted from the enterprise value in order to 
obtain the risky value of debt, which is equal € 302,50 million. Finally, the worth of the put 
option of debt is obtained as the difference between actual risk-free and risky debt. It represents 
at the same time the amount of promised payments that creditors are asked to “sacrifice” to 
facilitate business continuity and the shareholders value of debt reorganization plan. The 
inequality between the risk-free and the market value of debt (i.e. l = b – k) is therefore captured 
by the put value of debt. 
The situation before and after debt reorganization can be outlined as follows:  
 
 
 
A quicker approach for obtaining the difference between the riskless and the risky debt 
components consists in applying directing the Merton’s formula for pricing put options:  
𝑃 = 𝐷𝑒−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑉𝑒
−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(−𝑑1) 
 
Where D is still the nominal debt value at maturity and V is the enterprise value as estimated 
from future expected cash flows.  
 
BEFORE DEBT REORG. AFTER DEBT REORG.
EV D rf EV D mkt
404,02 429,67 404,02 302,50 429,67 - Put value
" E " E
-25,65 101,53 -25,65 + Put value
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Table 4: The direct computation of the put value  
 
As before, we assume that the dividend yield 𝑦 is equal to 0. From the resulting value for the 
put option, we compute the market value of debt by subtracting the actual risk-free debt value. 
Finally, the equity value is derived as the difference between the enterprise value and the market 
value of firm’s obligations.  
 
4.3.1 The Sensitivity Analysis 
At this point, it is interesting to perform a sensitivity analysis in order to highlight the effects 
on the put option of debt as some key parameters change. We know that almost all the inputs 
involved in the valuation can be observed from the market, except for the current value of firm’s 
assets and asset volatility. Their value is the result of some estimates and therefore is subject to 
a certain degree of uncertainty. We want, therefore, to study the effects on debt derived from: 
a) Changes in enterprise value expectations; 
b) Changes in asset volatility. 
In case of changes in EV expectations, holding the volatility constant, we can observe the 
following results:  
€ million t =  0A
a. Enterprise value 404,02
b. Risk-free debt value 429,67
c. Debt duration (years) 4
d. Risk-free rate 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 449,22
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35%
g. -d1 -0,31
h. -d2 0,39
i. N(-d1) 37,83%
j. N(-d2) 65,17%
k. Put value 127,18
l. Debt value 302,5
m. Equity value 101,53
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Table 5: Sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in enterprise values 
 
For the value of firm’s assets, we replace the results obtained from the valuation using the value 
drivers characterising the worst scenario and the best scenario, in comparison with our 
benchmark (i.e. the base scenario). Assuming all the other parameters being equal, we can 
observe the huge value of the put option of debt for very low expected values of firm’s assets. 
This means that, creditors are asked to accept a larger discount on their credits in order to let 
the firm continues its operations; in the worst scenario, the probability of default joins high 
levels. The higher is the initial value of the firm’s assets with respect to the debt amount and 
the lower is the probability of default. In the best scenario, therefore, the value of the put option 
is lower than in the base case, so that the difference between the risk-free and risky (i.e. market) 
value of debt is shrinking. We can conclude that these results are in line with our expectations 
about the relationship between uncertainty and values of capital components. The following 
graph captures the sensitivity of put values with respect to changes in the underlying assets, 
considering the results obtained in the previous table. It is clear the negative relationship 
between the enterprise value and put price: as the former increases, the latter declines with the 
probability of default.  
€ million WORST SCENARIO BASE SCENARIO BEST SCENARIO
ENTERPRISE VALUE 158,00 404,02 517,36
EV volatility  35% 35% 35%
Risk-free debt value 429,67 429,67 429,67
Debt duration (years) 4 0,011 4
Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10% 1,10%
Debt nominal value at maturity 449,22 449,22 449,22
d1 0,63-                                  0,31                             0,55                             
d2 1,33-                                  0,39-                             0,15-                             
N(d1) 26,76% 62,17% 70,88%
N(d2) 9,34% 34,83% 44,04%
Equity value 2,13 101,53 177,38
Debt value 155,87 302,50 339,98
Put value 273,80 127,18 89,70
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Table 6: Graphical representation of the put option sensitivity with respect to changes in 
enterprise value estimates 
 
We can now perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to firm’s asset volatility, by capturing 
the effects of a change in such a value on the put option. Understanding the changes in asset 
volatility through time is a fundamental issue in corporate finance. Asset volatility is a proxy 
for the riskiness associated to the realisation of future cash flow, which is the main driver of 
debt reimbursement. We will present such an analysis by focusing on the base scenario 
(correspondent to a volatility of 35%), with the goal of checking whether the model is able to 
account correctly changes in asset volatility:  
 
€ million
ENTERPRISE VALUE 404,02 404,02 404,02 404,02
EV volatility 25% 35% 42% 50%
Risk-free debt value 429,67 429,67 429,67 429,67
Debt duration (years) 4,00 0,01 4,00 4,00
Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10% 1,10% 1,10%
Debt nominal value at maturity 449,22 449,22 449,22 449,22
d1 0,23 0,31 0,37 0,44
d2 -0,27 -0,39 -0,47 -0,56
N(d1) 59,10% 62,17% 64,43% 67,00%
N(d2) 39,36% 34,83% 31,92% 28,77%
Equity value 69,57 101,53 123,09 147,02
Debt value 334,45 302,50 280,93 257,00
Put value 95,23 127,18 148,74 172,67
t = 0A
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Table 7: Sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in asset volatility 
If the value of the assets is expected to fluctuate widely up or down, the likelihood of default 
on debt is considerable and therefore the value of the put option tends to rise. This is due to the 
fact that the initial enterprise value can potentially reach very low levels as the volatility is high. 
From the previous table, we can state that as uncertainty associated to future values of firm’s 
assets increases, the value of the put option of debt increases as well, causing a rise in the 
difference between the nominal and the market value of debt. The price of the put option on 
firm’s asset is therefore monotonically increasing in the volatility of the assets, as we can 
observe from the following graph, by substituting the results obtained in the previous table: 
 
Table 8: Graphical representation of the put option sensitivity with respect to changes in 
volatility estimates 
 
4.4  CASE TWO: How to account for different maturity dates: Merton’s 
model adjustments 
In this framework, we would like to increase the complexity of the target capital structure, by 
considering at least two tranches of zero coupon bonds rather than a single one, with different 
maturity dates. In doing so, we remember Merton’s formula deriving equity value as a call 
option: 
𝐸 = 𝐶 = 𝑉𝑒−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐷𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡)𝑁(𝑑2) 
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Where delta, representing the sensitivity of the call option with respect to changes in the 
underlying assets, is derived as follows: 
∆ =  
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑉
=  𝑁(𝑑1) 
Whereas, 𝑁(𝑑2) of the previous formula represents the probability that the call option will 
finish in-the-money18 on a risk-neutral basis and consequently (1 − 𝑁(𝑑2)) is the associated 
probability of default.  Indeed, 𝑑2 stands for the number of standard deviations the assets value 
must fall to reach the default point. In other words, 𝑑2 symbolises the Distance to Default in 
this way:  
𝑑2 =  𝐷𝐷𝑡 =
ln (
𝑉
𝐷𝑃) + (𝑟𝑓 − 𝑦 −
𝜎𝑉
2
2 )(𝑇 − 𝑡)
𝜎𝑉√(𝑇 − 𝑡)
 
𝐷𝑃 is the Default Point, which in Merton’s model consists in the amount of the risk-free debt 
at maturity. A different interpretation of the default point has been developed in the 1980s by 
Moody’s KMV model, after the introduction of a more sophisticated capital structure. Such a 
default threshold is obtained by setting the face value of the zero coupon bond equal to the sum 
of face values of short-term liabilities and a fraction of the value of long-term liabilities (i.e. 
usually a half of them).  
The first half of the numerator represents the distance between the enterprise value and the 
default point at the evaluation date. The higher the enterprise value with respect to the default 
point, the higher would be the probability of the call option to finish in-the-money. The second 
term in the numerator is a drift term and indicates how the enterprise value is likely to evolve 
from the valuation date until the expiration of the option. The higher the risk-free rate 
(considered as a proxy for the risk-neutral return of firm assets), the higher is the probability of 
the call option to finish in-the-money. Whereas, dividends and asset volatility both reduce that 
probability: an increase in asset volatility or dividend yield determines a reduction in firms’ 
compound returns.  The denominator normalises the numerator in order to establish the DD in 
terms of standard deviations.  
                                                          
18 A call option is said to be in-the-money as the market value of the underlying asset (i.e. the enterprise value) is 
higher than the strike price (i.e. the value of risk-free debt at maturity).  
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As mentioned in the previous chapters, one of the main limitations of Merton’s model consists 
in assuming too simplistic capital compositions, ignoring the presence of many issues of loan 
outstanding, with different coupons, maturities and subordinated structures. In order to 
overcome such a restriction, we can attempt to extend the theoretical structure of the model, 
increasing therefore its complexity. A first attempt has been made by Geske (1979), who 
generalises Merton’s model by considering equity not as a simple call option on firm’s value, 
but rather as a compound option. He also increases the complexity of the balance sheet structure 
by introducing short and long-term debt, junior or subordinated debt, amortising debt, safety 
covenants and other possible promised or restricted payments. We want to focus our attention 
on the presence of both short and long-term debt. By considering two points in time 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, 
with 𝑡1 < 𝑡2, we can state that the firm is solvent in 𝑡1 whereas its value 𝑉𝑡1 is higher than the 
value of the short-term debt 𝐷1 plus the expected value of the long-term debt. In this regard, a 
refinancing assumption is usually involved, since the firm is unlikely to pay off its short-term 
obligations without shrinking the value of the firm and increasing the probability of default on 
the remaining ones. Since there are two maturities of debt, we can firstly identify two 
probabilities of default: a short-term probability in 𝑡1, associated to the short-term debt and a 
conditional long-term probability in 𝑡2, which is known as “forward” probability. The latter is 
conditional on not defaulting on the short-term debt. In addition to the short and long-term 
probabilities, we can mention a total or jointly probability of default in either 𝑡1 or 𝑡2 as well. 
According to Delianedis and Geske (1998), by considering equity as a compound option, there 
is more than one option to default on firm obligations: in correspondence of each maturity, 
equity holders can chose between reimburse the current obligation, maintaining the control over 
the company, or rather default, transferring the control to creditors. Each payment gives them 
the right to proceed to the next reimbursement, so it is like an option on the option. In other 
words, if equity holders exercise the option in  𝑡1 (i.e. they repay short-term obligations), then 
in 𝑡2 they will have another option: debt reimbursement or default. Whereas, the option in 𝑡2 
expires as the firm has defaulted on its debt in 𝑡1. We can formally explain such a framework 
in the following way; at the first maturity date, the firm is solvent if:  
𝑉𝑡1 > 𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑉𝑡1(𝐷2) 
The enterprise value at that date is higher than the nominal amount of short-term debt and the 
expected actual value of long-term debt.  
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From the previous formula we obtain a certain threshold for firm’s value in 𝑡1, below which the 
default is triggered:  
𝑉𝑡1
∗  = 𝐷1 + 𝑃𝑉𝑡1(𝐷2) 
𝑉𝑡1
∗  is exactly the strike price of the first option in a compound option context. Whereas, the 
strike price of the call option expiring in 𝑡2 is just the face value of the second debt tranche, i.e. 
𝐷2. In general terms, 𝑉
∗ - known as “cut-off value”- is an additional variable to be solved for 
in the problem. The idea of introducing a certain threshold for asset value determining default 
is not unused in literature. For example, Leland (1994) takes into account two possible 
bankruptcy determinants: the first is endogenously determined19, while the second involves a 
positive net-worth covenant20. In both cases, they have an important role in setting the values 
of debt and equity. When the bankruptcy threshold is chosen by the firm, rather than being 
imposed by a covenant (such as a positive net-worth requirement), its value will be as low as 
possible in order to maximise firm’s enterprise value. Whereas, in other cases, the choice of the 
bankruptcy level can be functional to equity value maximisation for any level of firm’s 
enterprise value. The asset value at which bankruptcy occurs is usually independent from firm’s 
current asset value; it decreases as the risk-free rate or asset volatility increases as well.  
Some years later, Leland and Toft (1998) assume either that bankruptcy can be triggered at 
exogenously specified asset values, such as debt principal value, or when cash flows are not 
enough to cover interest payments on debt. According to this theory, in case of a single tranche 
of debt outstanding, before its maturity, asset value may be low but still sufficient to pay debt 
holders and avoid default. Only at maturity, the firm will need substantial assets to avoid 
bankruptcy. These findings are in line with Merton’s assumption about bankruptcy occurring 
exclusively at maturity, since for a single zero coupon bond there is never an endogenous reason 
to default before expiration. Anyway, if the firm has more than one tranche of debt outstanding, 
the bankruptcy trigger is better determined in an endogenous way, depending on the maturity 
and the amount of debt as well. In such a framework, bankruptcy can occur at asset values that 
may be either lower or higher than the principal value of debt. As supported by many 
researchers in this field, the choice between endogenous and exogenous bankruptcy threshold 
                                                          
19 The endogenous bankruptcy threshold depends on some parameters, such as the risk-free interest rate, the 
corporate tax rate and asset volatility. 
20 The net worth covenant involves computing the difference between the market value of assets and firm’s 
default point (i.e. the asset value at which default will be triggered, which generally lies between total and 
current liabilities).  
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leads to substantial valuation differences, mainly for “junk” bonds. Indeed, with respect to the 
bankruptcy boundary chosen, we will obtain different results for equity and debt value as well.  
Delianedis and Geske (1998) take into account the asset value thresholds as identified earlier in 
order to obtain a closed-form solution for equity as a compound option on firm assets: 
𝐸 = 𝑉𝑁2[𝑑1 + 𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡1, 𝑑2 + 𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡2;  𝜌] − 𝐷2𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡2)𝑁2[𝑑1, 𝑑2; 𝜌]
− 𝐷1𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡1)𝑁(𝑑1) 
Where:  
𝜌 = √
𝑇−𝑡1
𝑇−𝑡2
 , 𝑑1 =
ln(
𝑉
𝑉∗
)+(𝑟𝑓+
𝜎𝑉
2
2
)(𝑇−𝑡1)
𝜎𝑉√𝑇−𝑡1
 and 𝑑2 =
ln(
𝑉
𝐷2
)+(𝑟𝑓+
𝜎𝑉
2
2
)(𝑇−𝑡2)
𝜎𝑉√𝑇−𝑡2
 . 𝑁2(•) is the cumulative 
bivariate normal standard distribution with correlation coefficient 𝜌. With respect to Merton’s 
formula, the bivariate normal standard distribution replaces the simple normal one. The strike 
prices – as we can observe from 𝑑1 and 𝑑2 formulas - correspond to the bankruptcy boundaries 
in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, respectively. The evident complexity of the solution for equity values with respect 
to the original Merton’s equation creates some implementation problems: firstly, the model 
requires precise and complete information about firm’s actual capital structure. Secondly, the 
process involved for transforming equity volatility into asset volatility is more complicated, 
since an additional variable needs to be computed (i.e. 𝑉∗).  
At this point, we want to propose an alternative version of the original Merton’s formula, which 
allows taking into account at least two tranches of zero coupon bonds with different maturity 
dates. Rather than considering equity as a compound option on firm value, we want to model 
equity as a combination of call options, i.e. 𝐸 =  𝐸𝑡1 + 𝐸𝑡2 , where 𝐸𝑡1 is call option with 
expiration date 𝑡1 and 𝐸𝑡2 is a call option as well but with maturity date 𝑡2, with 𝑡1 < 𝑡2. The 
option-pricing formula for equity value we can derive from the previous assumption is the 
following: 
 
E = 𝐶 = 𝑉1𝑒
−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡1)𝑁(𝑑 1
𝑡1) − 𝐷1𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡1)𝑁(𝑑 2
𝑡1) 
+(𝑉 − 𝑉1)𝑒
−𝑦(𝑇−𝑡2)𝑁(𝑑 1
𝑡2) − 𝐷2𝑒
−𝑟𝑓(𝑇−𝑡2)𝑁(𝑑 2
𝑡2) 
 
 
Where 𝑑 1
𝑡1 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑉1
𝐷1
)+(𝑟𝑓+
𝜎𝑉
2
2
)∗(𝑇−𝑡1)
𝜎𝑉∗√(𝑇−𝑡1)
 and 𝑑 1
𝑡2 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑉−𝑉1
𝐷2
)+(𝑟𝑓+
𝜎𝑉
2
2
)∗(𝑇−𝑡2)
𝜎𝑉∗√(𝑇−𝑡2)
. 
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The total enterprise value is still the underlying asset, as derived in case one, but it is portioned 
between the two call options in accordance to the cash flow expected to be generated until 
maturity, including the proceeds obtained from possible final divestitures and reorganizations. 
More precisely, in order to obtain a positive value for the put option, we assume that the 
enterprise value we can derive is almost proportional to the nominal debt that has to be 
reimbursed at maturity. 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 are respectively the strike prices of the first and the second 
call option on firm assets. They can be considered as proxies for the short-term debt (i.e. 
𝐷1 reimbursed in 𝑡1) and the long-term debt (i.e. 𝐷2 is reimbursed in 𝑡2). The idea of separating 
in such a way the total value of nominal debt follows directly from Moody’s KMV experience. 
The introduction in the model of two tranches of debt and therefore two expiration dates allows 
setting the barycentre of our analysis in more than a single point in the future, since the valuation 
approach proposed by Merton focuses exclusively on bonds maturity. In addition, such a 
modified version enables us dealing with situations in which firms in financial troubles benefit 
from the injections of liquidity, facilitating the continuation of operations. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, agreements between debtors and creditors usually based on going-concern 
assumptions involve the introduction of “new finance” that in most circumstances contributes 
to avoid firm default, increasing the probability of success associated to the attempt of target 
reconditioning. While most of pre-bankruptcy liabilities are frozen, the target needs liquidity to 
face the up-front costs for stabilising the business. It might seems counterintuitive that banks 
and other financiers would provide loans to companies in financial distress; anyway, credit 
extensions may be necessary to “protect” existing obligations. All types of lenders (banks, 
financial intermediaries...) benefit from pre-deductibility. As in case of privileged debts, funds 
obtained in such circumstances have shorter maturity and they are “senior” with respect to other 
loans. If we assume that the debt that has to be reimbursed in the short-term run consists in pre-
deductible or privileged debt, we are able to deal with different debt seniorities as well.  
As in Delianedis and Geske (1998), the short-term debt needs to be refunded before the long-
term debt, whose reimbursement is conditional to the preceding one. Therefore, the second 
tranche of debt will be paid if and only if the first tranche of debt has been completely 
reimbursed in 𝑡1. After assuming a certain “seniority” among obligations, we can represents 
graphically the value of firm’s securities at maturity in the following fashion: 
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Our analysis will continue by applying the modified version of Merton’s formula (in which 
equity is considered as the sum of two call options on firm’s assets), considering the same 
estimates of enterprise value, risk-free debt value, asset volatility and risk free rate 
characterising case one. The goal is to test if our model is consistent with our expectations after 
the inclusion of two maturity dates for firm’s obligations. We will proceed by performing a 
sensitivity analysis to check the impact on the put value of debt due to changes in debt structure: 
A. 70% of the estimated risk-free debt has to be reimbursed in 𝑡1 and the remaining amount 
in 𝑡2; 
B. 30% of the estimated risk-free debt has to be reimbursed in 𝑡1;  
C. 50% of the estimated risk-free debt has to be reimbursed in 𝑡1; 
 
4.4.1 Put values and put sensitivity with two tranches of debt  
A. 70% of the estimated risk-free debt reimbursement in 𝑡1 
We consider at first the framework in which the firm plans to reimburse 70% of the actual value 
of the risk-free debt in the short-term run (i.e. 𝑡1) and the remaining 30% in the medium-long 
run (i.e. 𝑡2). The probability of default should decline over time, or in other terms, the value of 
the put option should be lower in correspondence to the second debt maturity with respect to 
the first one, since the promised amount to reimburse is smaller. By considering the data of the 
previous case, we obtain the following results:  
 
 
 
Claim V < D1
Junior bond 0 V - D1 D2
  D1 < V < (D1 + D2) V > (D1 + D2)
Senior bonds V D1 D1
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Table 9: 70% debt reimbursement in 𝑡1 
 
The total enterprise value is still the same (i.e. € 404,02 million), as the sum of the risk-free 
debt value (i.e. € 429,67 million), which is taken into account for the computation of the strike 
prices of each call option. The maturity dates i.e. 𝑡1 = 2,20 and 𝑡2 = 4,79 years have been 
computed according to formula applied in case one. As expected, the value of the put option 
tends to decline from the first to the second expiration date. Almost 62,51% of the total put 
amount is explained by the price of the put option in correspondence to 𝑡1, where creditors are 
asked to accept a higher cut on their promised payments to let the firm continuing its operations. 
Once the first tranche of debt has been reimbursed in 𝑡1, the value of the second put option is 
lower, since lower is the promised amount to creditors. The model seems therefore in line with 
our expectations about a declining default probability over time. If we compare the resulting 
total put option (obtained by summing up the put options in 𝑡1 and 𝑡2) with that obtained in 
case one, we can see that it is slightly lower:   
€ million
a. Enterprise value 282,82 121,21
b. Risk-free debt value 300,77 128,90
c. Debt duration (years) 2,20 4,79
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 308,14 135,87
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,22 0,34
h. d2 -0,30 -0,43
i. N(d1) 58,71% 63,31%
j. N(d2) 38,21% 33,36%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 51,12 33,73
l. Debt value 231,70 87,47
m. Put value of debt 69,07 41,43
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 84,85
p. Total Debt value 319,17
q. Total Put value 110,50
t = 0A
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Table 10: Graphical representation of put values sensitivity A 
 
This result is probably due to the fact that the risk of default is better proportioned between 
the maturity dates, especially if we assume the firm benefits from the injection of “new 
finance” that allows reimbursing the big portion of debt in the short-term run.  
 
B. 30% of the risk-free debt reimbursement in 𝑡1 
We now take into account the reverse situation in which the firm plans to reimburse 30% of the 
actual value of the risk-free debt in the short-run with the proceeds obtained until that maturity, 
facing a bigger portion to pay back in the following years. In this framework, we expect to 
obtain an opposite trend with respect to the previous one and therefore a larger value for the put 
in correspondence to the second maturity date, leading to an increase in default probability over 
time. The firm in this case may face some difficulties in reimbursing the second tranche of debt 
if, after the payment of the first tranche, its value starts to follow a downward path and there 
are not significant divestitures or additional liquidity provided. On the other hand, under an 
optimistic scenario, we can suppose the company will have enough time to collect proceeds for 
ensuring the reimbursement of the long-term obligation as well. The results obtained after 
applying the formula are reported below:  
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Table 11: 30% debt reimbursement in 𝑡1 
 
By considering the previous expiration dates, but a different capital structure composition, we 
can confirm a different trend surrounding the value of the put option and default probability. 
The risk the firm will not be able to meet the second term obligation is higher with respect to 
the previous framework and should not be ignored. As mentioned before, one of the main 
limitation of Merton’s model is that it does not consider what happens to the firm enterprise 
value over time before debt maturity. It can fluctuate both up and down, influencing debt 
reimbursement.  If the proceeds obtained from the assets at a certain point in time were lower 
than the promised amount to bond holders, it would be reasonable to declare firm’s default on 
current and future obligations as well. The model does not take into account that unpaid 
obligations cannot be cancelled out, but rather they increase the following promised tranche of 
debt to reimburse. In other words, Merton’s model helps investigating firm’s financial situation 
only at maturity, ignoring intermediate default. As mentioned earlier, a possible solution to such 
a limitation should be introducing a certain barrier to the asset value determining the default 
point. Anyway, by considering the resulting value of the risky debt sensitive to the chosen 
barrier21, there is not a unique response.  
                                                          
21 For further information about this topic, see Leland and Toft (1996). 
€ million
a. Enterprise value 121,21 282,82
b. Risk-free debt value 128,90 300,77
c. Debt duration (years) 2,20 4,79
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 132,06 317,03
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,22 0,34
h. d2 -0,30 -0,43
i. N(d1) 58,71% 66,31%
j. N(d2) 38,21% 33,36%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 21,91 87,20
l. Debt value 99,30 195,62
m. Put value of debt 29,60 105,15
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 109,10
p. Total Debt value 294,92
q. Total Put value 134,76
t = 0A
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Even in this scenario, we want to compare the value of the put option with the results obtained 
in the previous cases: 
 
Table 12: Graphical representation of put values sensitivity A and B 
 
From the previous table, we can observe that the amount of the put option obtained in 
correspondence to case two B is to some extent higher than that obtained both in case one and 
case two A as well. This result is probably due to the effect of a higher probability of default 
associated to the second debt tranche, which contributes in determining almost 78% of the total 
put value.  
 
C. 50% Risk-free debt reimbursement in 𝑡1 
An intermediate framework with respect to those presented earlier consists in assuming a more 
balanced capital structure where half of the debt should be reimbursed in 𝑡1 and the remaining 
amount in 𝑡2. The following results are obtained by appropriately modifying the inputs of 
Merton’s formula:  
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Table 13: 50% debt reimbursement in 𝑡1 
 
From the previous table, we observe that the main value influencing the amount of the total put 
value is debt duration. As the latter increases, the difference between riskless and risky debt 
increases as well, rising the probability of firm’s default. If we would try to plot a graph relating 
bond’s maturity to the spread between riskless and risky debt over time, we will observe a 
humped shape: spreads are very low at short maturities, they increase with the latter and then 
decline again. This behaviour is in line with Merton’s findings, as 𝑉𝑡 > 𝐷. Intuitively, for 
shorter maturities, the obligation is not likely to default and therefore spreads are low. While, 
if maturity lengthens, there is sufficient time for the bond to default as there are more 
possibilities for the enterprise value to drop below the face value of debt, increasing spreads. 
For much longer maturities, conditionally on the absence of default in the past, the likelihood 
of default on average is declining, since firms have enough time to find resources for granting 
survival. In general, we think about two possible trajectories for the firm’s value, the former is 
increasing and the latter is declining with time. For shorter maturities, there may be not 
sufficient time to default on bond, even if the trajectory is low. Whereas, in correspondence of 
medium maturities, the declining path of firm value would have enough time to reach the 
default, leading to higher spreads with respect to short-term maturities. Finally, if the firm is 
solvent after a long period, it is much likely to have experienced increasing trajectories, 
€ million
a. Enterprise value 202,01 202,01
b. Risk-free debt value 214,84 214,84
c. Debt duration (years) 2,20 4,79
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 220,10 226,45
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,22 0,34
h. d2 -0,30 -0,43
i. N(d1) 58,71% 63,31%
j. N(d2) 38,21% 33,36%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 36,51 56,22
l. Debt value 165,50 145,79
m. Put value of debt 49,34 69,05
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 92,74
p. Total Debt value 311,29
q. Total Put value 118,39
t = 0A 
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obtaining lower credit spreads. By taking into account the option theory context, the reasoning 
is almost the same. The extent of the spread between riskless and risky debt values depends on 
the value of a European option on V, with strike D and time to maturity ( T – t ). Provided 𝑉𝑡 >
𝐷, the firm is likely to reimburse its obligations, so that the put value is low. When maturity 
increases, the put value tends to rise as well, reflecting a higher chance of default. Whereas for 
long-term maturities, the value of the put option declines again. As mentioned in the previous 
chapters, Merton’s model is based on the assumption of a Brownian Motion driving asset value 
over time. Since the latter involves a continuous path, for very short maturities and 𝑉𝑡 > 𝐷, the 
possibility for the firm value to “jump” down is very strict. If the process would include some 
discontinuities, then even in the short-term horizon, higher spreads would be generated since a 
“jump” to default can no more be excluded. According to Zhou (1997), a jump-diffusion model 
would better match the size of credit spreads on corporate bonds, generating various shapes of 
spread curve with respect to the diffusion approach adopted by Black, Scholes and Merton. The 
inclusion of a jump-diffusion process for valuing risky debt provides another way to increase 
the complexity of the original model, leading to implementation problems that we try to avoid 
in our analysis.  
As before, we compare the results obtained for the put values: 
 
Table 14: Graphical representation of put value sensitivity with respect to all debt structures 
 
Even if we assume that the firm is able to reimburse half of its obligations in the short-term and 
the remaining amount in the long-run, the amount of the put option associated to each maturity 
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date is not the same. Put values computed in correspondence to longer maturity dates are worth 
more than put options with shorter maturities, because of the potential risk for the firm to follow 
declining paths in value when expiration dates are not excessively too far in the future. Whereas 
the firm would be able to decide both the portion of the expected cash flow generated from the 
assets for debt reimbursement at each maturity and the amount of debt to repay as well, the 
combination enterprise value – risk-free debt that would ensure almost a flat probability of 
default over time is the following one:  
 
Table 15: Flat put values computation with two tranches of debt 
 
The underlying value of the first call option is equal to 52% times the total expected enterprise 
value at the moment of valuation (i.e. 52% * € 404,02 million  = € 210,09 million). While the 
underlying value of the second call option is computed by taking the difference between € 
404,02 million and the value obtained earlier. 54,5% of total risk-free debt (i.e. € 429,67 
million) should be reimbursed in correspondence to the first expiration date (i.e. 𝑡1) and the 
remaining 45,5% in the second one. Therefore, by considering the riskless interest rate, debt 
duration and asset volatility unchanged with respect to the previous cases, we obtain two values 
for the put option that are almost the same; meaning that the probabilities of default both in 𝑡1 
and 𝑡2 are quite smoothed. The intuition for obtaining such results mainly derives from the 
€ million
a. Enterprise value 210,09 193,93
b. Risk-free debt value 234,17 195,50
c. Debt duration (years) 2,20 4,79
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 239,91 206,07
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,17 0,39
h. d2 -0,35 -0,37
i. N(d1) 56,75% 65,17%
j. N(d2) 36,32% 35,57%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 34,18 56,84
l. Debt value 175,92 137,09
m. Put value of debt 58,26 58,42
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 91,02
p. Total Debt value 313,00
q. Total Put value 116,67
t = 0A
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previous assumptions about loan reimbursement over time. We remember that in case two A 
the probability of default is focused mainly in the short-term horizon and its declining over 
time, whereas in case two B the probability of default is increasing, due to the large amount 
that needs to be refund in the long-term horizon and the “maturity effect” as well. The latter is 
evident in second case C, where we assume a balanced debt reimbursement.  
 
4.4.2 Put values and put sensitivity with three tranches of debt  
After considering only two tranches of debt, we want to verify if our analysis can be extended 
to three tranches of risk-free debt as well, by adapting the original Merton’s formula. As a proxy 
for their maturities, we consider 𝑡1 = 1 years, 𝑡2 = 3 years and 𝑡3 = 5 years. The inputs of our 
analysis, such as the actual enterprise value, the actual risk-free debt value, asset volatility the 
and risk-free rate are still the same, allowing some comparisons among the results. In such a 
framework, we consider that 20% of obligations are reimbursed in 𝑡1 = 1 years, 50% in 𝑡2 = 3 
years and the remaining amount in 𝑡3 = 5 years. As before, we expect a higher amount for the 
put option in correspondence to the second maturity date, where half of the reimbursement will 
take place. The results obtained are the following: 
 
Table 16: Put value sensitivity with respect to three tranches of ZCB 
€ million
a. Enterprise value 80,80 202,01 121,21
b. Risk-free debt value 85,93 214,84 128,90
c. Debt duration (years) 1,00 3,00 5,00
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 86,89 222,04 136,19
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,12 0,02 0,35
h. d2 -0,23 -0,58 -0,44
i. N(d1) 54,78% 50,80% 63,68%
j. N(d2) 40,90% 28,10% 33,00%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 9,12 42,25 34,65
l. Debt value 71,69 159,76 86,56
m. Put value of debt 14,25 55,08 42,34
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 86,02
p. Total Debt value 318,01
q. Total Put value 111,67
t = 0A
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Our expectations are confirmed in this case as well: the value of the put option tends to increase 
as the nominal value of debt increases, rising the associated probability of default. From the 
succeeding figure, we can observe the tendency of the spread between riskless and risky debt 
over the time horizon and the humped shape mentioned before as well:  
 
Table 17: Put value evolution over time  
 
The probability of default in correspondence to very short maturities is very low, while it tends 
to increase in correspondence to medium-term maturities and decline again for longer 
maturities.  
Even after the introduction of three tranches of debt, we can consider a balanced debt structure, 
as we did in case of two tranches. The total actual enterprise value and risk-free debt are 
distributed in equal amount each year. The resulting amounts for the put options are therefore 
influenced by the presence of different maturity dates. We expect to obtain increasing put values 
from the first to the last expiration dates for the same reasons explained when dealing with two 
tranches of debt and an equilibrated bond composition. The following results demonstrate the 
validity of our assumptions:  
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Table 18: Put value sensitivity with a balanced debt structure 
 
Differently from the situation in which the debt structure is not balanced, we do not obtain a 
humped shape for the distribution of the put value over time, since it is increasing with the 
expiration date (i.e. there is a “maturity” effect), as we can observe from this graph:  
 
 
Table 19: Put value evolution over time with a balanced capital structure 
 
€ million
a. Enterprise value 134,67 134,67 134,67
b. Risk-free debt value 143,22 143,22 143,22
c. Debt duration (years) 1,00 3,00 5,00
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 144,81 148,03 151,32
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,13 0,26 0,40
h. d2 -0,22 -0,34 -0,38
i. N(d1) 60,26% 60,26% 65,54%
j. N(d2) 41,29% 36,69% 35,20%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 22,02 28,61 37,85
l. Debt value 112,66 106,07 96,82
m. Put value of debt 30,57 37,16 46,40
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 88,47
p. Total Debt value 315,55
q. Total Put value 114,12
t = 0A
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In a framework characterised by three tranches of debt, determining the combination of 
enterprise value and risk-free debt that ensures a flat probability of default over time can be 
more ambitious than in case of two tranches, even if the underlying reasoning is almost same. 
The following spreadsheet shows the necessary steps for obtaining almost equal values for the 
put option at each maturity:  
 
Table 20: Flat put value computation with three tranches of debt 
 
The combination of the enterprise value that should be addressed to debt reimbursement over 
time is 50,5% * € 404,02 million in 𝑡1, 29% * € 404,02 million in 𝑡2, and therefore 20,5% * € 
404,02 million in 𝑡3. Moreover, in order to obtain a smoothed probability of default over time, 
the company should reimburse 49% times the total amount of risk-free debt in 𝑡1, 29% in the 
𝑡2 and the remaining 22% in 𝑡3, with 𝑡1 <  𝑡2 < 𝑡3. Although the resulting values for the put 
options are almost equivalent, the increasing trend is not completely eliminated, as the 
succeeding representation suggests:  
  
 
€ million
a. Enterprise value 204,03 117,17 82,82
b. Risk-free debt value 210,54 124,61 94,53
c. Debt duration (years) 1,00 3,00 5,00
d. Risk-free rate 1,10% 1,10% 1,10%
e. Debt nominal value at maturity 212,87 128,79 99,87
f. EV volatility (sigma) 35,00% 35,00% 35,00%
g. d1 0,16 0,26 0,33
h. d2 -0,19 -0,34 -0,45
i. N(d1) 56,36% 60,26% 62,93%
j. N(d2) 42,47% 36,69% 32,64%
k. Equity value (BSM formula) 25,58 24,89 21,27
l. Debt value 178,46 92,28 61,56
m. Put value of debt 32,08 32,33 32,97
n. Total Enterprise value 404,02
o. Total Equity value 71,73
p. Total Debt value 332,29
q. Total Put value 97,38
t = 0A
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Table 21: Flat values for the put option with three tranches of debt 
 
When dealing with two or more tranches of bonds, it is necessary to assume that the firm has 
enough resources to meet all its intermediate obligations. Once the firm is not able to refund 
one of its promised payment, default on current and future obligations should be declared, 
unless another agreement with creditors is not achieved. Unfortunately, such a modified version 
of Merton’s model (as the original one) does not take into account explicitly the possibility of 
intermediate default, once the firm value has started to follow a downward path. On the other 
hand, the introduction of more than a single loan reimbursement may allow investigating the 
tendency of firm to default over time, which is measured by the value shifted from creditors to 
shareholders in light of debt reorganisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32,08 32,33
32,97
0
10
20
30
40
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
79 
 
Conclusion 
 
The valuation of distressed firms is a very complicated topic, since there are not “ad hoc” 
models that take into account all their specific features, such as low or negative cash flows, 
declining margins and decreasing growth rates as well. Actual academic literature provides a 
large spectrum of traditional models usually applied for valuing companies in normal business 
circumstances. Among them, there are cash flow-based models and other approaches based on 
market multiples and option theory as well. They need some “adjustments” before being applied 
for valuing firms in financial troubles, since their original version tends to underestimate default 
probabilities. The systematic solution proposed in this writing starts with the assessment of firm 
enterprise value, which is provided by considering the discounted cash flow approach. In this 
regard, negotiations among management, creditors and shareholders play an important role. 
Assuming the company will be able to continue operating as a going-concern, the realisation of 
future free cash flows depends on the approval of a reorganization plan by creditors, who 
usually accept a discount on their promised payments in order to avoid a bankruptcy situation. 
When discounting the expected proceeds achievable from the existing assets, a particular 
attention should be focused on the cost of capital determination, since the commonly applied 
WACC approach does not admit dynamic capital structures and therefore decreasing levels of 
firm exposure, with the goal of reaching a more sustainable path. Once we obtain an estimate 
for the enterprise value, the valuation continues by implementing Black, Scholes and Merton 
(BSM) model, which is useful for the determination of debt and equity values. Distressed 
companies usually show a market (i.e. risky) value of debt lower than the nominal (i.e. riskless) 
amount due to the presence of a substantial probability of default. The spread between them 
quantifies the benefits of debt restructuring for equity holders. In the BSM model, such a 
difference between riskless and risky debt is quantified by the price of a put option written on 
firm assets. In our case study, we show the entire valuation process, starting from the simplified 
framework proposed by Merton, which involves a single tranche of zero coupon bond 
outstanding. The results are strictly sensitive to variables that cannot be observed directly from 
the market, such as the enterprise value and asset volatility, which needs to be estimated 
somehow. We therefore propose a sensitivity analysis to verify the effects on put values as one 
of the previous input changes. Moreover, firm capital structure can be progressively enriched 
by introducing two tranches of zero coupon bond with different maturity dates. In this way, we 
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try to increase the original model complexity in order to attenuate the gap between theory and 
real firms’ experience. The admittance of short and long-term obligations requires some 
arrangements to the traditional equity pricing formula: equity is no longer considered as a single 
call option, but rather as a linear combination of call options written on firm assets with different 
strike prices, depending on the promised amount to creditors. In this framework, we mainly 
examine the effects of debt maturity and debt amount on put values determination. We 
consequently study the evolution of firm default probability over time as debt structure changes. 
Finally, we suppose the existence of three tranches of debt (and three maturity dates). An 
interesting judgement involves finding the combination of enterprise value and risk-free debt 
amounts that allows the firm having almost a smoothed probability of default over time. In 
general, suggested modifications to the original Merton’s model let focusing the assessment on 
more than one barycentre, since the likelihood of firm’s default is perceived only at maturity, 
when the enterprise value and the promised amount to debt holders are compared. We provide 
in this way a valid attempt for upgrading traditional valuation models that are usually far from 
the real word experience and complexity.  
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